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Abstract 
The healthcare industry is growing fast and its services have an intense effect in human 
lives, thus providing the need and opportunity for improvement by using operations and 
information management methodologies. In this dissertation, we research three emerging issues 
regarding the healthcare industry. First, we consider the economics of precision medicine (PM) 
treatments. PM is a surging healthcare field consisting of a set of high-cost complex medical 
procedures that provide targeted treatments according to the individual characteristics of each 
patient. We develop a cost-benefit decision model of a patient undergoing PM treatments to assess 
learning curve effects in cost reduction through interaction with a centralized database repository. 
We also develop a simulation model to study the dynamics of the PM approach and discuss insights 
derived from this model. 
In our second essay, we research operational aspects in the implementation of MTM 
(Medication Therapy Management) services. MTM is a recently developed set of services 
provided by community pharmacies aiming to optimize drug therapy and improve therapeutic 
outcomes of medication-controlled conditions in patients through a direct counselling and follow-
up from pharmacists. We formulate queuing and simulation models of a community pharmacy’s 
workflow to optimize delivery of MTM services. We consider metrics such as the profitability of 
the pharmacy, the service rate, and the welfare of patients. Using our models, we determine 
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conditions when economies of scope should be realized, how to redesign workflows, and how to 
improve capacity management. 
Finally, in our third essay, we conduct an empirical analysis to study the apparently recent 
decline of emergency departments across the U.S. We consider operational causes for this 
phenomenon and the effect from changes in the insurance industry such as the evolution of the 
Affordable Care Act in recent years. We find that contrary to what some hospitals have reported, 
competition is not the main reason for the closure of their emergency departments. States with a 
declining number of emergency departments are more sensitive to the change of the hospitals’ 
financial situation and availability of medical resources.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The current healthcare industry is going through an exciting and challenging phase. On the 
one hand, the emergence of new technologies and new medical treatments brings new 
opportunities for achieving economic efficiency through economies of scale and scope. For 
instance, new medical models of customized treatment such as precision medicine or medication 
therapy management (MTM) are at an early stage of development and could be more expensive 
than traditional general-population treatment models. However, because of its close relationship 
to information systems learning technology, precision medicine has the potential of benefiting 
from economies of scale as the volume of treated patients increases. Similarly, MTM has the 
potential of benefiting from economies of scope as pharmacies expand their services to providing 
more personalized counseling and monitoring of patients’ drug usage. 
On the other hand, one of the major functions of healthcare industry, the emergency 
department services, has faced dramatic changes in recent years, especially in the number of patient 
visits. Because of these changes, many U.S. states have reacted differently: some of them have 
increased their number of emergency departments, while others have reduced the number of 
emergency departments. These differences may be caused by different healthcare policies in each 
state. However, the overall net trend across the U.S. is for a decline in the number of emergency 
department services. This dissertation focuses on studying these three emerging issues in 
healthcare management through three essays.  
In Essay 1, we investigate precision medicine, a new treatment approach that has evolved 
as an alternative to traditional medical treatments. Concretely, we study how patient’s choice and 
a treatment pricing are related to each other as time evolves. Contrary to the traditional medicine 
broad approach to treating health problems, precision medicine provides more targeted treatments 
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according to the unique individual characteristics of each patient. However, the use of this new 
revolutionary medical option has grown very slowly because of its complex implementation 
process and current high costs. The cost of the process is expected to decrease as more information, 
mapping effective treatments to individuals, is gathered in centralized databases; thus, the database 
can be seen as enabling economies of scale. In our research, we focus on developing an economic 
model to study the impact of information on precision medicine costs in the short and long term. 
We initially use a decision tree model approach to find breakeven points between traditional and 
precision medicine treatments. We also develop a simulation model of the precision medicine 
database development process. By analyzing the different effects of different policies, our research 
aims at determining ways to maximize the social welfare of the system. 
In Essay 2, we study the efficient redesign of the workflow in the adoption of a new 
healthcare service, medication therapy management (MTM), in community pharmacies as a new 
service channel to improve patient care. MTM is personalized medical care designed to improve 
communication between patients and their healthcare team; and optimize medication use for 
improved patient outcomes. MTM empowers patients to take an active role in managing their 
medications (see American Pharmacists Association et al. 2008). For a pharmacy, to reduce cost 
by increasing resource utilization is of great importance. One way to achieve this is by optimizing 
workflow processes and designing new layouts for pharmacy operations in order to accommodate 
and better provide MTM services. In our analysis, we build economic models based on queuing 
theory. Also, we establish an optimization model for the workflow of pharmacy operations. We 
use Rockwell Arena for the simulation in different scenarios, such as a pharmacy running only 
typical prescription and counseling services, a pharmacy providing typical and MTM services, a 
pharmacy completely dedicated to MTM services, etc. Based on the scenario analysis, we aim to 
Yucheng Chen - University of Connecticut, 2019 
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find a better way to provide services that integrate profitability for the pharmacies and benefit of 
patients at the same time in real practice. 
In Essay 3, we study the decline of emergency service departments in the U.S. and analyze 
the possible reasons behind it. As we know, in the U.S., emergency departments are exceedingly 
busy. This is because of two reasons, the rapid increase in the number of emergency room visits 
and the slight decrease in the number of emergency rooms. In an open market, high demand leads 
to high supply. Especially for an emergency service, which has very low demand elasticity, the 
supply should be sufficient. Though emergency departments charge more fees for service, research 
shows that emergency departments are not as profitable as we think. Because of the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act, or EMTALA, which forces all emergency departments that 
accept payments from Medicare or Medicaid, to provide certain level of medical care to any 
visitors; many free riders take advantage of the act and use emergency departments as their free 
healthcare provider without paying their bills. Though emergency departments cannot say no to 
frequent flyers, hospitals can decide whether to maintain their emergency departments or not. It is 
very likely that hospitals remove their emergency departments or reduce the capacity of their 
emergency departments to play with the policy. In 2014, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) went 
effective. The decline of the uninsured rate might lead to fewer frequent fliers. It could also be a 
relief of the emergency departments. In this essay, we study what could be potential reasons for 
the decline of emergency departments, and to determine the inner logic of this phenomenon. Based 
on those reasons, we research whether the ACA really motivated hospitals to focus more on 
emergency service or not. 
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Chapter 2. Precision Medicine or Traditional Medicine - an Analysis of a Patient’s Choice 
2.1 Introduction 
Precision medicine is the use of personalized data to provide, integrate, and interpret 
information about an individual’s health and better management (Snyder, 2016). Individual data 
are compiled from sources such as sequencing of the DNA (genome), measuring of biomolecules 
in the body, sensors to continuously monitor physiology and activity, and studying the microbial 
community that resides in the body. The cost of sequencing genomes has decreased dramatically 
in recent years and has had a large impact on personal genomics. In particular, one area of highest 
impact is cancer, which will strike 40% of people in their lifetime (Snyder, 2016).  
Precision medicine provides an alternative to treat patients. It classifies individuals into 
subpopulations whose members (and their tumors) are genetically similar, and probably can be 
treated by the same therapies (Timmerman, 2013). Precision medicine for the treatment of cancer 
is based on the context of a patient's genetic content (Lu et al., 2014) or other molecular or cellular 
analysis. It usually consists of a series of activities including gene sequencing, pathogenesis 
identification, disease database matching, customized medicine development experiments, 
database updating, and so on. Development of a personalized treatment requires the use of 
intelligent-platform experiment-based techniques involving the use of patient’s cell cultures for 
multiple screening runs of different depth (i.e., dosage, toxicity, functional test, molecular targets, 
etc.) and outcome analysis guided by machine-automation and machine learning to improve the 
efficiency (Tang-Schomer, 2017). Therefore, personalized treatments are more expensive than 
general traditional treatments and cost-benefit analysis is really a major concern. 
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A less expensive approach is using a proven successful treatment of a similar case that 
matches the patient’s characteristics. This experience-based approach relies in the use of a data 
repository of historical treatments generated as a by-product of previous experiment-based 
findings. One main factor to decide whether a patient should use a newly experiment-based 
personalized treatment as described before or an experience-based database treatment is the size 
of the data repository. As more experiment-based personalized treatments are performed and more 
data points are added to the database, finding a match between a current patient and a previously 
treated patient becomes more likely. Thus, as the database grows the number of experiment-based 
personalized treatments, and hence, the overall cost of the precision medicine approach is expected 
to decrease. 
In this dissertation, we propose a tentative abstract model of the decision process of a 
patient, and his supporting healthcare providers, who is undergoing a precision medicine treatment 
and must decide whether to use a (more expensive) experiment-based personalized treatment or a 
(less expensive) experience-based database treatment. In the model, the main driver of the decision 
is a cost-benefit analysis of the patient’s situation that incorporates the expected cost and the 
likelihood of success of the treatments. In addition, we generalize the abstract model to a two-step 
decision model, where a patient first decides whether to use a traditional medicine method or a 
precision medicine method, and then in the next level whether to use experiment-based 
personalized treatment or an experience-based database treatment. We also incorporate three 
different database information release mechanisms into our model, where a patient makes rational 
decisions based on a fully open to a fully close database. We find what the breakeven point would 
be for a patient to select between a traditional and a precision medicine treatment , and what the 
breakeven point between an experiment-based personalized treatment and an experience-based  
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database treatment. This leads to finding an economic breakeven point to decide whether to match 
the patient's profile to an existing case, or to develop a new personalized treatment via 
experimentation. By considering information gathered from patients who choose to develop an 
experiment-driven personalized treatment into a database, we hope to understand how information 
technology dynamics (as a learning process) affect the overall cost of this precision medicine 
approach. To do so, we develop a simulation model to study the evolution dynamics of the database 
and the overall cost of the precision medicine treatments as the number of patients grows through 
time. We then apply our simulation model to different scenarios, where we consider the likelihood 
of applying a matching treatment successfully. Finally, based on our numerical analysis from the 
simulation, we provide insights about the learning process associated with precision medicine and 
some implications to public policy. 
2.2 Theoretical Background and Related Literature 
In our research, two streams of research provide the foundation: precision medicine 
theory and application, and healthcare outcome evaluation. In this section, we review the 
literature of these two streams. 
2.2.1 Precision Medicine 
In recent years, precision medicine (PM) has become a popular term in the new medical 
treatment development frontier. Drug-drug and gene-gene similarity measures for drug target 
prediction are proved effective in practice (Perlman, 2011). Many researches focus on data driven 
drug-target prediction, based on the similarity of drugs and targets (Ding, 2013). However, the 
approach determining the similarity between two individuals genetically can vary from method to 
method. Since the difference in genomes is multi-dimensional, to project high dimensional data 
into low dimensional, analytical-able data needs complex algorithms in Gene Ontology (GO). 
Yucheng Chen - University of Connecticut, 2019 
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Although research on the relationship between sequence similarity and function are still at the 
beginning steps, some general trends have been observed (Schlicker, 2006). Current technology 
has already discovered that it is possible for us to reveal molecular functions with unknown genes 
when similar to known ones up on certain accuracy level. Although people have widely discussed 
the advantages of the PM approach in the literature, adopting its prevention and treatment 
strategies in real medical practice is still at a very early stage (NRC, 2011). Until now, the medical 
industry has applied precision medicine to treat limited genetic related illnesses, especially some 
types of cancer such as lung cancer (Jamal-Hanjani et al., 2014) and metastatic breast cancer 
(Arnedos et al., 2015).The public recognizes the success of precision medicine, but big challenges 
are still hindering precision medicine from incorporating it into our existing medical system.  
2.2.2 Health Outcome Evaluation 
One challenge faced in PM is whether people are able to afford the huge cost of precision 
medicine, because personalized treatments are always more expensive. Whether it is worthwhile 
to apply precision medicine treatments instead of traditional medicine treatments really depends 
on how people value the utility of the treatment based on his or her own condition. Finding a 
general measurement for the value of precision medicine is of great importance (Grosse et al., 
2008). On the other hand, to target a disease caused by a certain defective gene(s) needs 
sophisticated decision algorithms, because a gene segment could be the source of several diseases 
(Jameson et al., 2015). Thus, whether precision medicine will become a main stream method in 
future medical treatment depends on whether we can make precision medicine affordable by 
enlarging biological databases, which entails identifying problematic genes and genetically 
classifying patients efficiently (Collins and Varmus, 2015). 
Yucheng Chen - University of Connecticut, 2019 
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Generally, there are two major aspects to consider when valuing the economic benefit of 
applying medical procedures: health outcomes and treatment cost. Correspondingly, in the 
literature researchers have used cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
focusing on different aspects of the procedures (Grosse et al., 2008). Typically, CEA focuses on 
the cost per unit of "natural" health outcomes, such as the cost of a 1% increase in the five-year 
survival rate. CEA is suitable for a single target disease since it compares only one aspect of the 
outcomes at a time. One type of CEA is based on a very popular measure called the quality-
adjusted life year index, which maps the life duration and quality into a comparable number 
(Klarman and Rosenthal, 1968). However, since it is very hard to define the state of "quality" of 
life, the method cannot be widely applied and is under debate (Prieto, 2003; Mortimer and Segal, 
2008; Dolan, 2008). Another popular CEA is the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), 
which is the ratio of incremental costs to incremental outcomes and it captures how an additional 
input affects the health outcomes. A patient can decide whether to undergo further treatment based 
on an ICER value. It is also controversial since it may limit the availability of treatments to patients 
because of healthcare rationing. In contrast, CBA is more comprehensive and can be applied in a 
wider range of contexts. It considers more than only the health outcomes, but also many non-health 
outcomes. The idea is to map all the benefits and losses into monetary units, and then to calculate 
the net benefit. One method for the mapping is to estimate the indirect value of regain/loss of 
health, such as future value of economic production when with and without health. A second 
approach of CBA is more customer-driven and is favored by most economists; it is called 
willingness-to-pay (WTP), which is the minimum amount of money that a person is willing to pay 
for the benefit from a treatment. The implementation of WTP is very helpful for decision makers 
to have criteria for choosing a plan or not. However, WTP depends on a subjective contingent 
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perceived valuation of each person (Donaldson et al., 2002; Gafni, 1991; O'Brien and Viramontes, 
1994; Jarrett and Mugford, 2006). All CBA results are expressed in monetary units, which makes 
it a good indicator for decision makers to compare different treatment scenarios (Krupnick, 2004), 
while CEA compares direct results, making it easy for healthcare system to see the outcomes 
(Oliver et al., 2002; Grosse et al., 2007). 
When it comes to precision medicine, traditional CEA and CBA approaches as discussed 
above need to be revised and re-defined in some cases because of the personalized nature of the 
procedure. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, there have been very few attempts to do so. 
For instance, Grosse et al. (2008) introduce preliminary extensions of CEA and CBA for genetic 
testing, their paper also contains references to prior attempts of economic evaluations of genetic 
testing. Unfortunately, those approaches mostly focus on static information and do not consider 
the evolving nature of precision medicine and reducing costs from learning curves. In our research, 
we propose an original combination of the CEA and CBA approaches. To do so, we consider the 
monetary value of the precision medicine experiment and experience-based procedures (as in a 
CBA approach), as well as the likelihood of success of the procedures, to compute an economic 
break-even point (or indifference point) between procedures. From this, we derive a formula that 
compares the cost ratio of the procedures to the probability of success to determine (as in a CEA 
approach) which procedure to perform for each patient. Our approach also considers the learning 
dynamics as reflected by an increasing database of successfully treated patients using personalized  
procedures. 
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2.3 Theoretical Research Model 
2.3.1 Genome as Information 
Like many researchers (e.g., Calude and Paun, 2001), our approach to the structure of the 
genome is targeted to our goal of a cost-benefit analysis of a precision medicine procedure. Hence, 
we ignore a lot of the biochemical information, which are not necessary for our analysis. On the 
contrary, we present our models using a simplified version of the DNA. A DNA molecule is a 
polymer that serves as the instruction manual to guide the development process from a single cell 
to a complex individual. It is made up of four constituent parts (nucleotide bases). These bases are 
adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine (T), and they are paired as A - T and C - G. 
A human DNA molecule contains about six billion base pairs into 46 chromosomes. Hence, it can 
be seen as a finite string variable consisting of about six billion characters, each character taking 
values in {AT, TA, CG, GC}. In particular, assignment of values to this variable constitutes an 
individual's genome. Genomes differ by “variants”, a variant is a DNA sequence change. 
Approximately 3.8-4 million variants (one in every 1,200 bases) are single letter or base changes 
(called single nucleotide variant: SNV). There are 50,000-850,000 small insertions and deletions 
of 1-100 bases ("indels"). There are thousands of large insertions, deletions, inversions, and other 
types of chromosome rearrangements (some several hundred kilobases, 1 kilobase = 1,000 bases) 
and are called structural variants (Hartl, 2000; Snyder 2016). 
The human genome sequence is a composite of several individuals yielding what is called 
the “reference” genome. The reference genome in its more finished form was completed in 2003 
and it was prepared using DNA pooled from several individuals (thus it does not represent a single 
individual’s genome) (Snyder 2016). It consists of approximately 3 billion base pairs, and includes 
each of the 22 chromosomes plus the X and Y sex chromosomes. State of the art technology allows 
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sequencing an individual’s genome in a few days. Variants are mapped when comparing millions  
of short sequenced fragments (100-150 bases in length) of an individual to the reference genomes. 
By comparing to known fragments, it can be deduced whether there is deletion, insertion, or 
inversion in the sequenced regions (Snyder 2016). 
In bioinformatics, it is customary to quantify DNA similarity across individuals by 
modeling DNA as strings of characters and using an “edit” or Levenshtein distance to compute the 
similarity between strings (Gusfield, 1999). Concretely, we denote by V the set of all the different 
DNA molecules (strings) in the human population. For each v in V, we denote by l(v) the length 
of v, that is, the number of characters in v. Hence, v=(v1,v2,…,vl) is a string such that each character 
vi is in {AT, TA, CG, GC}. The Levenshtein distance between two strings is the minimum number 
of single-character edits (insertions, deletions or substitutions) required to change one string into 
the other (Gusfield, 1999). 
A key notion in our approach is that every genome can be matched to a number in the [0,1] 
interval. Concretely, if we (arbitrarily) map the values AT, TA, CG, and GC to 0, 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively via a function (say) h, we can then create a map ϕ:V -> [0,1], that assigns to each 
string v in V a unique number of the form: 
 𝜙(𝑣): =∑ℎ(𝑣𝑖)4
−𝑖
𝑙(𝑣)
𝑖=1
 (1) 
in the interval [0, 1]. Notice that ϕ is a bijection between V and ϕ(V); we call ϕ(V) the set of 
numerical genomes. This way, if there is a finite subset of E of V consisting of the genomic 
information of a group of patients, each individual genome in E can be represented as a point in 
the interval [0, 1]. Furthermore, if T denotes a set of personalized treatments that have been 
successful in treating the patients in E, then a genomic-treatment database D based on the 
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individuals in E can be modeled as Cartesian product D := ϕ(E) × T, where for every pair (v, r), 
with v in E and r in T, we have (ϕ(v), r) in D. 
The Levenshtein distance induces a distance in the set of numerical genomes ϕ(V), namely, 
 dist(x, y) := distL(ϕ-1(x), ϕ-1(y)), (2) 
for x, y in ϕ(V), where distL is the Levenshtein distance. Therefore, we can determine the closeness 
between two individuals in a genomic database, or between one individual not in the database and 
one in the database, by using this induced distance. 
2.3.2 Cost-Benefit Model 
We model the process of a patient's decision through a workflow as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
New Patient 
Arrival
Individual and 
Tumor Sequencing
Is There a Cost-
Benefit Match?
Apply Known 
Treatment for 
Specific Sequence
Develop 
Personalized 
Treatment Via 
Experimentation
Yes
No
Successful 
Treatment?
No
Yes
Record New 
Information
 
Figure 1: Precision medicine treatment workflow 
In this model, we assume that patients have been already diagnosed with a cancer 
(cancerous tumor) and they can be successfully treated if we are able to find an adequate 
(personalized) treatment. To start the process, the patient’s genomes, as well as the tumors, are 
sequenced for each new arrival. Next, the treatment database is searched for possible genome 
matches. The matching database string can be an exact or partial match based on the induced 
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Levenshtein distance dist from (2). If there is a close enough database match, then the patient will 
decide whether to use this matching case based on a cost-benefit analysis that incorporates the 
likelihood of the success of the matching treatment. If the there is no database match or there are 
some but is not cost effective, then a personalized treatment will be developed from scratch via 
experimentation. If the database treatment is not successful, then the experiment-based approach 
will also be used. If the patient is treated by an experiment-based personalized treatment 
successfully, then the patient’s genomic data and the details of his treatment are recorded into the 
database for future use. 
Concretely, we denote by Ce the expected cost of developing an experimental treatment 
from scratch, whereas we denote by Cd the cost of applying a known-treatment from a matching 
database case, where we assume Ce > Cd. A patient chooses an experiment-based or experience-
based treatment based on a cost-benefit analysis as follows. Let Dt denote the current genomic-
treatment database at the time of arrival of the patient number t. From the discussion in the previous 
section, Dt consists of a finite number of pairs (x,r), where x in [0,1] is a numerical representation 
of the genome of a previously treated patient and r denotes that patient’s treatment. We denote by 
X1, X2, …, Xt, … the numerical genomic values of patients in order of arrival to the system. We 
assume that the Xt are independent and identical distributed random variables in the interval [0, 1]. 
Given δ ≥ 0, we define the probability of a δ–matching of patient as a successful probability 
function that is positive related to the number of other individual patients in database Dt whose 
induced Levenshtein distance is less than or equal than δ. Formally, let B(y,δ) be the subset of [0,1] 
consisting of xi(s) such that dist(xi,y) ≤ δ. For a given database Dt, define (abusing notation) the 
number of points in [0,1] within δ distance from at least one element in Dt as 
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 𝐼𝑡(𝑦, 𝛿):= 𝐵(𝑦,𝛿) ∩ [0,1]. (3) 
We denote the probability of a successful database treatment by p, where f  is a link function 
that relates p and I. 
 𝑝𝑡(𝑦, 𝛿) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑡(𝑦, 𝛿)) (4) 
Therefore, from a cost-benefit analysis point of view, a patient should first select an 
experience-based (database) treatment whenever we have 
 𝐶𝑒 ≥ 𝐶𝑑 + (1 − 𝑝𝑡 (𝑦, 𝛿))𝐶𝑒 , (5) 
given that Xt = x. In other words, from inequality (5), it follows that the experience-based database 
treatment should be first selected when the ratio of the costs is below the probability of success of 
the database treatment: 
 
𝐶𝑑
𝐶𝑒
≤ 𝑝𝑡(𝑥, 𝛿). (6) 
Notice that the δ–matching probability is an increasing function of the size of the database 
because the more points added to it, the greater 𝐼𝑡(𝑦,𝛿). Since the cost ratio on the left-hand side 
of (6) is less than 1, we conclude that, as long as new patients are added to the database, there will 
be a breakeven point (indifference point), where equality is attained in (6). After that point in time, 
it will be more cost-effective to perform all treatments using the database approach. 
2.3.3 Simulation Model 
 
We use a Monte-Carlo simulation model to study the dynamics of our proposed approach. 
For simulating the decisions of patients, we first to need to give the probability function of 𝑝𝑡(𝑥, 𝛿). 
Here we assume the probability function as: 
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 𝑝𝑡(𝑥,𝛿) =
𝑒(𝛽0+𝛽1𝐼𝑡(𝑥,𝛿))
1+ 𝑒(𝛽0+𝛽1𝐼𝑡(𝑥,𝛿))
 (7) 
The probability function follows a logistic regression model, where 𝛽0  and 𝛽1  are 
parameters that depend on the properties of the cancer. In the simulation, for each scenario under 
consideration we generate a sample of 250,000 patients to go through the workflow from Figure 
1. To simulate the matching process, in our experiments we assume that the probability density 
function of genome distribution corresponds to the density of a uniform distribution. At each 
iteration of the algorithm, we randomly generate a point in the interval [0,1] to represent the 
location of the new patient on the database. 
The closeness of a match is determined by a proxy for the induced Levenshtein distance; 
namely, we use a simple absolute deviation difference between the randomly generated point 
corresponding to the new patient and the already existing points corresponding to existing database 
entries. In particular, a database point is considered a close match if the absolute difference 
between the new point and the database point is less than or equal to predefined value of δ. This is 
without loss of generality because if there are k tumor-causing variants and they are ordered such 
they represent the first k characters of the patient's genome string, then by choosing δ = 10-k the 
two matching strings would agree in their first k characters (bases). Moreover, if an exact match 
is required, then we can always set δ = 0 in the simulation. 
 
2.3.4 Numerical Results 
 
Using our simulation model as described in the previous section, we ran several scenarios. 
In particular, we considered three values of δ (i.e., 0.005, 0.10, and 0.20) to run our simulations. 
Figure 2 shows two graphs, the graph on the left corresponds to the growth of the database as the 
number of patients increases, whereas the graph on the right corresponds to the decrease in average 
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cost per patient as the number of patients increases. The average cost per patient at time t is 
computed as the total accumulated cost up to time t divided by the number of arriving patients up 
to time t. 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the average database size and the average cost per patient as the 
number of arriving patients increases. 
We can readily see that when δ is doubled, the size of database is almost halved. Also, as 
δ increases, the average cost per patient decreases. 
We assumed a uniform distribution and a normal distribution for genome separately. In 
Figure 3, the blue lines show the growth of the database and the decrease in average cost per patient 
with uniformly distributed genomes, while the red lines show those with normally distributed 
genomes. We can see when the genome is uniform distributed, the size of database increases faster 
than when normally distributed. This means that if people have a normally distributed gene 
sequence, it is more likely to find a good match, and thus it is not necessary to have a large database 
for support. From the average cost graph, we can also see that the average cost for the normal 
distribution decreases faster. Even though the uniform distribution has an overall low requirement 
for database treatment and lower average cost, the downside is that for patients whose gene 
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sequences are not represented in the middle, it is not easy to find a good match. Even when the 
database is large, they benefit less from the database treatment.  
 
Figure 3: Evolution of the average database size and the average cost per patient cost with 
different gene distribution. 
The ratio of the cost of a database treatment to the cost of an experimental treatment plays 
another important role. We used ratios of 02, 0.5, and 0.8 separately for the simulation. In Figure 
4, they are represented by blue, yellow, and red lines, respectively. For the size of the database, 
we can see that when the ratio is high (database treatment is comparatively expensive), the database 
increases a little bit faster than when the ratio is low. After the fast growth phase, the difference 
among the three is pretty small. Therefore, we know that a high cost of the database treatment will 
stimulate the growth of database in a small scale. However, the ratios affect the average cost in a 
large scale. This is reasonable because almost all the patients would select to use the database 
treatment and if the cost of database treatment is low, then the average cost is also low. 
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Figure 4: Evolution of the average database size and the average cost per patient as cost 
ratio increases. 
 
Figure 5: Average learning rate as the number of arriving patients increases. 
With respect to learning curve effects, our results show an exponential decrease of the 
average cost per patient at a constant speed exponent (see Figure 5). Moreover, the learning rate 
increases with δ. In our experiments we also tried other probability d istributions (e.g., normal 
distribution) and found that the learning curve is not significant affected by how gene sequences 
are distributed (Figure 6), and it is more affected by the cost ratio between the database and the 
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experimental treatments (Figure 7). When the ratio is low, the learning curve has a faster decrease 
speed rate. 
 
Figure 6: Average learning rate as Delta increases 
 
 
Figure 7: Average learning rate with different gene distribution 
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2.4 Extended Model 
In this section, we discuss an extended two-step model that includes traditional medicine 
and precision medicine together, as well as the wealth of the patient. 
2.4.1 Extended Model Analysis 
As we discussed above, the decision of which treatment to use is an economic concern. In 
this section, we use the following decision tree to model the problem:  
Figure 8: Patient-level decision tree 
In this extended model, the doctor and the patient must decide between the use of a 
traditional treatment or a precision medicine treatment. If a traditional treatment is selected, the 
doctor will try all the available treatments one by one, until one works for the patient or until all 
the treatments are tried unsuccessfully. If a precision medicine treatment is selected, the patient 
will undergo a gene sequencing, which is essential for the doctor to know the pathogenesis of this 
particular cancerous tumor. By reading the gene sequence, the doctor will understand whether the 
pathogenesis is curable or not using the possible traditional treatment methods. If the pathogenesis 
Perform experiments 
Does not 
work 
Use an existing record 
New patient arrival 
Traditional Treatment 
 
Works 
Does not 
work 
Gene 
Sequencing 
No treatment will work 
Curable  
Works 
Works 
Does not 
work 
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is not curable, the patient leaves the system. If the patient is curable, then the doctor decides 
whether to use an experience-based database treatment method or an experiment-based 
personalized treatment for the patient. If the doctor selects to perform experiments and the 
treatment is successful, the outcome will be recorded in the database for this disease. Otherwise, 
nothing will change in the database. For simplicity, we assume a patient cannot change from a 
traditional treatment process to a precision medicine treatment and vice versa at any stage. Since 
timing is very important in healing a cancerous tumor, the patient can only take one treatment and 
cannot switch between different treatments. 
The determination of which treatment is more suitable for a specific patient is not only a 
decision based on effectiveness of the treatment, but also on the financial situation of the patient. 
Each person has an assessment of the value of his own life. Thus, we denote by 𝐵𝑡 the utility for 
the patient of applying traditional medicine and 𝐵𝑝 the utility of applying precision medicine 
(Notation table in Appendix A.1). If 𝐵𝑡 > 𝐵𝑝, then traditional medicine is a better choice. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that a cancer has M different types of pathogeneses. For the M 
pathogeneses, there are m different effective treatment methods targeting the first m of M 
pathogeneses respectively, where m <= M. If a patient’s tumor is caused by the jth pathogenesis, it 
can be only cured by the jth treatment method with probability pj. Thus, the probability of a 
successful treatment by traditional medicine is  
 𝑝𝑡 := ∑ 𝑔𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1
, (8) 
where 𝑔𝑘  is the proportion of patients whose illness is caused by the k
th pathogenesis. The expected 
cost of a traditional treatment is then 
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 𝐸(𝐶𝑡) = ∑ (𝑔𝑘𝑝𝑘(∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 ))
𝑚
𝑘=1 + (1−∑ 𝑔𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1 )∑ 𝐶𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1 , (9) 
where 𝐶𝑘 is the cost of the k
th traditional treatment. We denote the health economic value of a 
patient (HEVP) by 𝑣. So, the expected overall utility for a patient from using a traditional treatment 
is  
 𝐸(𝐵𝑡) =∑ 𝑔𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1
𝑣 − 𝐸(𝐶𝑡) (10) 
In this extended model, we use a different matching method, from the method discussed in 
Section 2.3. We will still “map” a patient’s genome to a value between 0 and 1. Instead of finding 
all the matches, whose Levenshtein distances are less than δ, and then using a logistic function, 
here we only search and use the treatment with the best match, i.e., whose Levenshtein distance is 
the shortest among all other matches. The probability of a successful experience-based database 
treatment is  
 𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝑒𝛼(1 − 𝑑)
2, (11) 
where d is the Levenshtein distance between the new patient and the best match. 𝑝𝑒  is the 
probability of a successful experiment treatment, and 𝛼 is a scale factor between 0 to 1. From 
expression (11), we can see that the probability is always in the range from 0 to 1. Even if the 
genomes of the new patient and the best match are exactly the same, the probability of a successful 
experience based database treatment is lower than applying an experiment based treatment. 
2.4.2 Scenario 1: Database Released after Gene Sequencing 
In this scenario, we assume that a newly arrived patient knows the size of the database n, 
but he does not know the exact position of the records located in the database. After he has obtained 
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his gene sequence, he is only notified of the Levenshtein distance d between his sequence and the 
closet sequence in the database. 
To solve the corresponding two-step decision problem, we use a backward propagation 
method. Using this method, we determine the best payoff between an experience-based database 
treatment and an experiment-based treatment. Then we calculate the expected payoff based on the 
payoffs of two precision medicine methods, and compare it with the payoff of traditional medicine. 
Suppose a patient has already decided to use precision medicine treatment, he knows his gene 
sequence and needs to decide whether to use an experience-based database treatment or an 
experiment-based treatment. If he selects the latter, the overall cost is the cost of gene sequencing 
𝐶𝑔, the cost of the experiments 𝐶𝑒 and the cost of the application of the treatment 𝐶𝑝. Thus, the 
utility of selecting an experiment-based personalized treatment method is  
 𝐵𝑒 = 𝑝𝑒𝑣 − 𝐶𝑔 −𝐶𝑒 − 𝐶𝑝. (12) 
Since the patient knows his gene sequence, the utility of selecting an experience-based  
database treatment is a function of d, and can be written as 
 𝐸(𝐵𝑑) = 𝑝𝑒𝛼(1 − 𝑑)
2𝑣 − 𝐶𝑔 −𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝑒𝛼(1 − 𝑑)
2. (13) 
We derive a breakeven point from using either treatment and obtain 
 𝑑′ =
{
 
 
1 −
√1 −
𝐶𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑣
√𝛼
𝑝𝑒𝑣 − 𝐶𝑒 > 0,
1 𝑝𝑒𝑣 − 𝐶𝑒 < 0.
 (14) 
When the patient finds 𝑑 ≥ 𝑑′ , it is a better choice to select an experiment-based  
personalized treatment method, otherwise it is better to select an experience-based database 
treatment.  
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When we trace back to the decision point of whether to choose a traditional treatment or a 
precision medicine treatment, the patient needs to consider the expected payoffs from both 
methods. As we know, the expected utility of a traditional treatment only depends on the HEVP, 
while the utility of a precision medicine treatment also depends on the patient’s gene sequence 
position in the database as well. Since the gene sequence position is unknown to the patient, 
patient’s decision to do a traditional medicine or a precision medicine is a function of the 
distribution of his Levenshtein distance treatment with respect to the best match. It is reasonable 
for a patient to believe that the records in the database are uniformly distributed. Based on that, we 
can derive the probability distribution function of d (Poof is Located in Appendix A.2).  
 𝑓(𝑑)= {
2(𝑛 −1)(1− 2𝑑)𝑛 + 2(1− 𝑑)𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 0.5,
2(1− 𝑑)𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 0.5 < 𝑑 ≤ 1.
 (15) 
Thus, the expected utility of a precision medicine is  
 𝐸(𝐵𝑝)=  𝑝𝑐 (∫ 𝑓(𝑑)𝐸(𝐵𝑑) 𝑑(𝑑)
𝑑′
0
+ 𝐵𝑒 ∫ 𝑓(𝑑) 𝑑(𝑑)
1
𝑑′
) − (1 − 𝑝𝑐)𝐶𝑔, (16) 
where 𝑝𝑐  is the probability that the cancer is curable (Poof of this result can be found in Appendix 
A.3). With both, the expected utility of using precision medicine and traditional medicine, known 
to the patient, the patient can make a rational decision. 
When there are more and more patients select to use precision medicine, the expected 
utility also changes. As the number of patients goes to infinity, we have 
 lim
𝑛→∞
𝐸(𝐵𝑝) = 𝑝𝑒𝑣𝑝𝑐 − 𝐶𝑔 −𝑝𝑐𝐶𝑝. (17) 
2.4.3 Scenario 2: Public Database 
To improve efficiency in the use of the database, in this scenario, we assume a transparent 
database open to the public, which means that a newly arrived patient knows everything about the 
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database, including the size of the database n and the position of each record in the database, before 
he makes any decision. 
Since the difference between the Scenario 1 and 2 occurs at the beginning of the decision 
process, where a patient has not decided to use precision or traditional medicine, and gene 
sequencing has not been conducted, a patient will have the same process to decide whether to use 
experiment-based as in Scenario 1, if he has already decided to employ precision medicine. Now 
the patient can calculate the expected Levenshtein distance between his location and the closest 
record before his gene sequencing, based on the database. 
Before his gene sequencing, the patient believes his genome position could be anywhere 
in the segment 0-1. Since he knows there are already n records in the database, it is easy for him 
to get ascending values of 𝑙1…𝑙𝑛, where 𝑙𝑟 is the value of the record in the r
th position from small 
to large in the database. Based on that, we create a list of those positions, with 0 and 1 as the first 
and last items, and the average values of two adjacent values:  
 (0, 𝑙1,
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
, 𝑙2,
𝑙2+𝑙3
2
, … ,
𝑙(𝑛−1)+𝑙𝑛
2
, 𝑙𝑛, 1). (18) 
We get the difference of each two continuous items in the list and form a new list as: 
 (𝑎1,𝑎2 ,… , 𝑎2n−1, 𝑎2n), (19) 
where 𝑎1 = 𝑙1 − 0,𝑎2 =
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
− 𝑙1,… , 𝑎2n = 1 − 𝑙𝑛. We sort the items in list (19) by ascending 
order and name them 𝑆1…𝑆2𝑛 . As we know, when the patient selects precision medicine, he selects 
the better choice between an experiment-based personalized treatment and experience-based 
treatment, whose breakeven point is 𝑑′. 𝑑′ here is similar as in the previous scenario, but has 
another form 
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  𝑑′ = {1−
√1−
𝐶𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑣
√𝛼
𝑝𝑒𝑣(1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑆2𝑛)
2) > 𝐶𝑒
𝑆2𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑣(1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑆2𝑛)
2) < 𝐶𝑒 .
, (20) 
Thus the utility of selecting precision medicine is 
 
𝐸(𝐵𝑝) = 𝑝𝑐 (∫ 2𝑛𝐸(𝐵𝑑)
𝑆1
0
 𝑑(𝑑) +∫ (2𝑛 − 1)𝐸(𝐵𝑑)
𝑆2
𝑆1
 𝑑(𝑑) + ⋯
+ ∫ (2𝑛 − 𝑢 + 1)𝐸(𝐵𝑑)
𝑆𝑢
𝑆(𝑢−1)
 𝑑(𝑑)
+ ∫ (2𝑛− 𝑢)𝐸(𝐵𝑑) 𝑑(𝑑)
𝑑′
𝑆𝑢
+ 𝐵𝑒 (1−∫ 2𝑛
𝑆1
0
 𝑑(𝑑) −∫ (2𝑛 − 1)
𝑆2
𝑆1𝑖
 𝑑(𝑑)− ⋯
− ∫ (2𝑛 − 𝑢 + 1)
𝑆𝑢
𝑆(𝑢−1)
 𝑑(𝑑) − ∫ (2𝑛− 𝑢) 𝑑(𝑑)
𝑑′
𝑆𝑢
))− (1 − 𝑝𝑐)𝐶𝑔 
(21) 
where d is between 𝑆(𝑢+1)  and𝑆𝑢 (Poof of this result can be found in Appendix A.4). 
2.4.4 Scenario 3: Database Closed to Public 
A patient’s privacy is a major concern. Protecting a patient’s genetic information 
confidentiality is a prerequisite to prevent potential crimes and genetic. Comparing to previous 
scenarios, where other patient’s information in the database can be compromised, in this scenario, 
we assume the most conservative database policy to secure the safety of patient’s information. We 
assume that a newly arrived patient only makes a decision based on the size of the database, he is 
not informed of the records position at any moment during his treatment, before and after the gene 
sequencing.  
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Since the patient does not know the position of other patients in the database, he would 
estimate the Levenshtein distance of the best match after his gene sequencing using the following 
distribution: 
 𝑓(𝑑|𝑥) =
{
 
 
2𝑛(1 − 2𝑑)𝑛−1 0 < 𝑑 < 𝑥,
𝑛(1 − 𝑥 − 𝑑)𝑛−1 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑑 < 1 − 𝑥.
when 𝑥 < 0.5,
2𝑛(1− 2𝑑)𝑛−1 0 < 𝑑 < 1 − 𝑥,
𝑛(𝑥 − 𝑑)𝑛−1 1 − 𝑥 < 𝑑 < 𝑥.
when 𝑥 > 0.5,
  
 
(22) 
where x is the genetic position of the patient (Poof in Appendix A.5).  
Here we assume that 𝑦 = |1 − 2𝑥|, where 𝑦 ∈ [0,1]. Thus, we can simplify the formula 
above as follows:  
 𝑓(𝑑|𝑦) =
{
 
 2𝑛(1 − 2𝑑)𝑛−1 0 < 𝑑 <
1 − 𝑦
2
,
𝑛 (
1 + 𝑦
2
− 𝑑)
𝑛−1 1− 𝑦
2
< 𝑑 <
1+ 𝑦
2
.
 (23) 
Now we can get the expected probability of a successful experience-based database 
treatment after gene sequencing as 
 
𝐸(𝑝𝑑|𝑦) = 𝐸(𝑝𝑒𝛼(1 − 𝑑)
2|𝑦)
= ∫ 2𝑛(1 − 2𝑑)𝑛−1𝑝𝑒𝛼(1 − 𝑑)
2 𝑑(𝑑)
1−𝑦
2
0
+∫ 𝑛 (
1+ 𝑦
2
− 𝑑)
𝑛−1
𝑝𝑒𝛼(1 − 𝑑)
2 𝑑(𝑑)
1+𝑦
2
1−𝑦
2
. 
(24) 
 
𝐸(𝑝𝑑|𝑦) =
1 + 4𝑛 + 2𝑛2 −𝑦1+𝑛(2 + 𝑛 + 𝑦(𝑛− 1))
2(𝑛+ 1)(𝑛+ 2)
𝑝𝑒𝛼. (25) 
With the expected probability of a successful database treatment, we obtain the expected utility 
from an experiment-based personalized treatment method 
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 𝐸(𝐵𝑑|𝑦) = 𝐸(𝑝𝑑|𝑦)𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑣𝑝𝑐 −𝐶𝑔 − 𝑝𝑐𝐶𝑝 (26) 
When 𝐸(𝐵𝑑|𝑦) < 𝐵𝑒, an experiment-based personalized treatment is a better choice for the 
patient. Unfortunately, the formula does not have an analytic solution for 𝐸(𝐵𝑑|y) < 𝐵𝑒, when 
𝑛 > 4. However, an approximate numerical solution is still possible for a patient to make a 
decision. Since  
 
𝑑𝐸(𝐵𝑑|𝑦)
𝑑𝑦
=
1
2
𝑦𝑛 +
𝑛 − 1
2(𝑛+ 1)
𝑦1+𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑣 ≥ 0 (27) 
𝐸(𝐵𝑑|𝑦) is monotonically increasing. Thus, we conclude that the solution has the from 𝑦 ≤ 𝛽, 
where 𝛽 ∈ [0,1].Thus we get the expected utility of precision medicine:  
 
𝐸(𝐵𝑝) = 𝑝𝑐 (∫ 𝑓(𝑦)𝐸(𝐵𝑑|𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝛽
0
+𝐵𝑒(1 − 𝛽))− (1 − 𝑝𝑐)𝐶𝑔
= 𝑝𝑐 (∫ (
1+ 4𝑛 + 2𝑛2 − 𝑦1+𝑛(2 + 𝑛 + 𝑦(𝑛 − 1))
2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 2)
𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑣 − 𝐶𝑔
𝛽
0
− 𝐶𝑝)𝑑𝑦 + (𝑝𝑒𝑣 − 𝐶𝑒 −𝐶𝑔 − 𝐶𝑝)(1− 𝛽))− (1 − 𝑝𝑐)𝐶𝑔
= 𝑝𝑐(
𝛽 (2(𝑛+ 1)2 − 1−𝛽𝑛+1 (1 +
𝛽(𝑛−1)
𝑛+3
))
2(𝑛+ 1)(𝑛+ 2)
𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑣𝑖
+ (𝑝𝑒𝑣 − 𝐶𝑒)(1− 𝛽) − 𝐶𝑝)−𝐶𝑔, 
(28) 
with 𝐸(𝐵𝑡) the same as previous scenarios. The patient can compare 𝐸(𝐵𝑝) and 𝐸(𝐵𝑡) to get a 
better choice. 
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2.4.5 Numerical Results 
Using our simulation model as described in the extended models, we ran several scenarios 
with different assumptions. In particular, we considered the effects on the growth of the database 
using different HEVP distributions and with different database transparency policies. It is 
reasonable to assume that a patient’s personal wealth can be used as a proxy for his HEVP. In our 
research, we use three different wealth distributions, whose means are the mean net worth of 
the average U.S. household of 2018. When we use uniform distribution as the distribution of 
personal wealth, we find that as time goes by, the databases grow in all the three scenarios (see 
Figure 9). It is obvious that Scenario 2 has the highest growth rate and it is the fastest to reach 
stability.  
Next, we analyze the growth of the database when wealth is normally distributed. In this 
scenario, we found a similar pattern as with the uniform distribution. In addition, with a normal 
distribution, growth is more sensitive to information transparency, (see Figure 10). Only Scenario 
2 (the most transparent scenario) shows a quick growth of the database. This means that when the 
database is not transparent enough, most people would still select to use traditional medicine, and 
it can delay the growth of the database and hurt the long-term benefit of the whole society in a 
large scale. The most realistic distribution of wealth in the modern world follows a Pareto 
distribution (Pareto, 1964). Pareto distribution comes from Pareto principle (aka 80/20 rule), 
which states that, almost 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes (Pareto, 1964). It is also 
applicable to economics, since around 20% of the population owns 20% of the whole wealth. In 
Figure 11, we use a Pareto distribution for the simulation. It is still the same that the Scenario 2 
has the fastest growth. However, compared to the previous distributions, the growth of the database 
is the slowest. Since, most of the patients are not rich in this case, it would be of great important 
Yucheng Chen - University of Connecticut, 2019 
30 
 
for a government to subsidy poor patients in using precision medicine, so that the database can 
reach its stable stage quickly, benefiting more people in future. 
 
Figure 9: Evolution of the average database size in uniformly distributed health value 
evaluation 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of the average database size in normally distributed health value 
evaluation 
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Figure 11: Evolution of the average database size in Pareto distributed health value 
evaluation 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
We have developed an original economic model of the precision medicine process that 
incorporates both cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. We also extend our model to a more 
general format and consider database transparency policies. Our results show that as long as new 
patients continue being added to the genomic-treatment database, eventually the database will 
reach a size that will (1) provide a matching treatment for most patients and (2) the expected cost 
for patients will be more affordable than the cost from developing a personalized treatment  from 
scratch (inequality (5)). Further, the convergence to this state of the database is exponentially fast 
in the number of treated patients. We also find that the evolution of the database is sensitive to the 
database transparency policy. A transparent policy can always help patients to make good 
decisions and benefit the society in the long term. In a more equitable in wealth society, the growth 
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of the database shows a different pattern. It is easy for a database to reach a sufficient size for all 
society to benefit, when wealth is more equally distributed.  
Our formulation provides a decision criterion (inequality (6)) that is statistically 
computable in practice and it is useful for patients to decide the best approach when undergoing a 
precision medicine treatment. From a public policy point of view, a comprehensive database does 
not need a high amount of records, so that for the society benefit it makes sense to implement a 
subsidy policy for less wealthy patients with the objective of boosting the database growth. 
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Chapter 3. Incorporating Medication Therapy Management into Community Pharmacy 
Workflows 
3.1 Introduction 
People in the U.S. take more medications than ever before (Kantor et al. 2015). Over 80% 
of older adults use at least one prescription daily (Qato et al. 2016), over one third takes five or 
more mediations (Charlesworth et al. 2015), and 70% of all ambulatory office visits results in a 
new or continued medication (Kaufman et al. 2002). Community pharmacies are the primary 
sources of these medications, filling over 4 billion prescriptions annually (Surescripts 2017). 
However, while more medications exist than ever before (namely, over 10,000 different 
prescription medications are currently on market (AHRQ 2019)), medication non-adherence is a 
serious problem. Medication non-adherence is the intentional or non-intentional failure of a patient 
to take a medication as prescribed and is often attributed to missing doses. Non-adherence to 
medication is a critically significant and prevalent problem as half of all U.S. patients stop taking 
a chronic medication within one year of it being prescribed. This is a dire, longstanding problem, 
best surmised in 1985 by U.S. Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, MD, with his famous line “Drugs 
don’t work in patients who don’t take them”. Indeed, medication non-adherence not only hurts 
patients but also the economy: it wastes $300 billion annually because uncontrolled chronic 
conditions like diabetes, high blood pressure and COPD lead to higher healthcare utilization, more 
extensive disability, and earlier death (Iugal and McGuire 2014). 
To increase medication adherence, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) promotes 
a group of pharmacist-delivered services called medication therapy management (MTM) (United 
States Congress 2003). Most often delivered by pharmacists, MTM is a “distinct service or group 
of services that optimize therapeutic outcomes for individual patients that are “independent of, but 
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can occur in conjunction with, the provision of a medication product (Bluml 2005). These services 
began in 2003 under the United States’ Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act, commonly referred to as the Medicare Modernization Act (United States 
Congress 2003). This law affects the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, the largest buyer of 
healthcare services in the nation. Under this law, Medicare Part-D plans (aka, insurance plans) are 
required to provide or contract to provide MTM services to certain Medicare beneficiaries. Patients 
regularly targeted for MTM services are those who have multiple chronic conditions, multiple  
prescription medications, and/or meet an annual drug-cost threshold. Part-D plans often contract 
with a third party to deliver MTM services. These third party companies assist with MTM-delivery 
by acting as an intermediary between a Part-D plan and the community pharmacist who deliver 
the MTM service to the patient. 
The third party intermediaries usually assign eligible beneficiaries to community 
pharmacies for MTM services, and provide online platforms for MTM documentation and billing. 
In turn, the community pharmacy and Part-D plan beneficiaries are able to communicate in a 
standardized fashion. Community pharmacies are pharmacies that are open to the public and serve 
the local population (e.g., mass chain, grocery, ‘retail’ or independent pharmacies) with an array 
of services, most notably checking and dispensing prescriptions, but also often compounding, 
counseling, and immunizations. These community pharmacies employ community pharmacists, 
who ultimately are the providers of MTM services to Medicare Part-D beneficiaries.  
Under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Part-D plan’s MTM programs must meet 
some minimum requirements. First, MTM programs mostly offer Medicare beneficiaries at least 
one Comprehensive Medication Review (CMR). A CMR is an annual review that includes at least: 
(1) updating the patient’s personal medication record, (2) a medication action plan, and (3) a 
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written summary of the discussion between the pharmacist and the patient- that is shared with both 
the patient and his prescriber(s). During a CMR, pharmacists systematically collect patient-specific 
information, access the patients’ medications and conditions, prioritize problems found, and then 
work with the patients, their caretakers and their prescribers to resolve any problems found. 
Designed to be interactive, CMRs between a patient and pharmacist are delivered face-to-face (e.g. 
in the pharmacy, or patient’s home) or telephonically. The second  type of requirement Part-D 
Plans’ MTM programs must offer is called a Targeted Medication Review (TMR). A TMR are 
quarterly reviews of patients’ current medication lists and are done to identify single potential 
medication-related problems related to the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid’s quality metrics. 
Medicare Part-D MTM services are well known to significantly improve patient outcomes, lower 
healthcare costs, and optimize medication use. However, unfortunately only 15-30% of patients 
who are eligible to receive MTM actually end up receiving the services (CMS 2019) and as such, 
the CDC characterizes MTM services as chronically “underused” (CDC 2014).  
There are several reasons why MTM is under-delivered to Medicare Part-D beneficiaries. 
First, patients, doctors, nurses, and other healthcare providers often are unaware what MTM 
services are, and that they are readily available. Secondly, community pharmacists are generally 
isolated from other healthcare professionals and healthcare settings. For example, not only are 
community pharmacists remotely located from other healthcare providers and staffs, but 
community pharmacists neither readily receive, exchange nor otherwise have access to the same 
patient health history housed in other care settings (e.g., hospital records, primary care providers’ 
records, specialists’ records). Community pharmacists most often rely on patients’ self-provided 
health history to make clinical decisions (even though significant evidence exists that patients can 
be poor historians and keepers of their own health history). Without this information, community 
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pharmacists have little on which to base their clinician decisions and deliver meaningful MTM 
services (APhA 2014).  
Another known and major reason MTM services are underutilized is because community 
pharmacists’ lack of time to deliver the services. Specifically, the resources community 
pharmacists need to deliver MTM services, like pharmacist and technicians’ time, space, integrated 
information systems, and patient recruitment techniques are insufficient (Casserlie and Dipietro-
Mager 2016, Osborne et al. 2011, Smith et al. 2017). Naturally, if reimbursement to community 
pharmacies for MTM services were sufficient, then those community pharmacies would be 
incentivized to invest in the resources needed to deliver MTM. However, currently, the 
reimbursement for MTM services community pharmacies receive is insufficient to incentivize 
pharmacies to invest in delivering MTM services. In other words, there exists a mismatch between 
what community pharmacies must invest to deliver MTM, and the return on that investment. 
Because the cost to deliver MTM is outweighed by low reimbursement, community pharmacies 
do not prioritize delivering MTM services over other services like medication dispensing (APhA 
2014). In fact, some community pharmacists are so dedicated to patient care, that it is not 
uncommon for them to deliver MTM services on their own time (Smith et al. 2017), but this 
delivery model is unsustainable.  
The mismatch between resources needed to deliver MTM and MTM’s reimbursement 
creates an environment where community pharmacists’ have little incentive to shift work away 
from medication dispensing towards MTM. If however, MTM could be integrated into a normal 
dispensing workflow, increased delivery could improve the services’ availability and recognition, 
and thus increase the probability of perceiving the services’ benefits and utilization. Therefore, in 
order to increase MTM delivery and thus achieve positive patients’ outcomes, it is essential to 
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understand how MTM delivery could be efficiently integrated into pharmacists’ normal dispensing 
workflow. To date, no literature has addressed pharmacies’ inefficiencies in integrating MTM into 
normal dispensing processes by applying operation management principles, and thus, no research 
addresses pharmacies’ internal ability to address and influence the underlying issues relating to 
ROI. This knowledge gap is detrimental because inefficiencies in MTM delivery lead to decreased 
MTM service prioritization by pharmacies, underutilization of MTM, and increased medication 
non-adherence by their patients.  
In our research, we use queuing models and process simulation to study several scenarios 
that vary in the type of provided service, assignment of personnel, the demand for services, and 
other operational factors. For all the scenarios, we use simulation to compare results and actual 
data to verify our results as they relate to economies of scope models. When comparing results we 
will also consider several metrics such as the profitability of the pharmacies, the service rate of 
pharmacies, and the social welfare of patients.  
3.2 Literature Review and Background 
3.2.1 Literature Review 
While pharmacies are financially incentivized by Medicare and private insurance to 
complete CMRs and TMRs, merely introducing these services to outpatient pharmacies may not 
be sufficient to build sustainable MTM output. Addressing components of pharmacy workflow 
through measures such as plan-do-study-act cycles, staff surveys, opportunity mapping, and 
quantitative reporting may be necessary for successful MTM implementation (Sneed et al. 2018). 
While previous literature in pharmacy simulation exists, there is little specifically regarding 
community pharmacies’ operations. Previous simulation research has predominantly focused on 
institutionalized (e.g., hospital, mail-order, long-term-care, etc.) pharmacies. While hospital and 
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community pharmacies both exist to aid in the medication-dispensing system, their daily 
operations and purpose are vastly different. For example, institutional pharmacies often have much 
greater integration into their larger healthcare systems, and make great distinction among 
pharmacists’ roles (i.e., between pharmacists that deliver direct-patient care and those who check 
and dispense prescriptions). Community pharmacies’ operations are vastly different from this 
model. In contrast to hospital pharmacists, community pharmacists’ must span several roles 
simultaneously (i.e., counselor, dispenser, checker, immunizer etc.). Furthermore, community 
pharmacists are highly accessible, whereas hospital pharmacists are largely inaccessible to their 
patients. As such, literature regarding community-pharmacists’ interruptions has shown workflow 
interruptions which are common in community pharmacies and the causes are multi factorial, 
including patients, technicians, and technology alike (Reddy et al. 2018). Some time-in-motion 
research (Chang et al. 2018) has characterized actions performed by pharmacists and support staff 
during the provision of MTM services and has compared actions performed according to practice 
characteristics, however, previous work on the operation of MTM delivery is scarce. The previous 
literature on MTM delivery has focused heavily on identifying service determinants and testing 
interventions rather than examining simulations.  
3.2.2 Community Pharmacy Prescription Filling Workflow 
An overview of the customary steps in community pharmacies’ prescription filling process 
and MTM services can be seen in Figure 12. Of note, many sub-steps and sub-processes occur 
within each step and some pharmacies may combine some steps (e.g., safety verification and 
product verification may be combined). Similarly, some roles may be expanded, contracted, or 
overlapped depending on the specific pharmacy, and may routinely change within the same 
pharmacy to account for volume changes. As such, pharmacists are legally and ethically 
Yucheng Chen - University of Connecticut, 2019 
39 
 
responsible for all work completed by all staff within the pharmacy; they can complete all steps of 
the below process. On the other hand, pharmacy technicians may perform many tasks under the 
direct supervision of the pharmacist, but not all of them. Tasks that cannot be delegated to a 
technician include those that involve any clinical decision making, patient counseling, and MTM 
services (CMR or TMR). Lastly, prescriptions overseen by the Drug Enforcement Administration 
may require extra steps depending on the pharmacy’s location and state law (including but not 
limited to special inventory processing, documentation and verification processes) and are not 
shown. This is a description of the main steps in the workflow:  
Figure 12 Community pharmacy workflow 
1. Prescription Arrival: Prescription orders arrive at the pharmacy via multiple methods. 
Prescriptions may arrive physically on paper hand-delivered by patients and their caregivers, 
electronically via Internet (e-prescriptions or eRx’s), or via fax/telephone. 
2. Prescription Entry: Prescriptions are entered into the pharmacy’s prescription filling 
software by a technician and the inventory affirmed. A claim for the prescription is sent 
electronically to the patient’s insurance. If a claim rejection or other issue is encountered, a 
technician and/or pharmacist will work to adjudicate the issue. 
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3. Prescription Filling: A technician fills a bottle with the prescription medication and 
affixes a label. 
4. Safety Review: A pharmacist reviews the entered prescription for simple data entry 
errors and completes a safety check called a “drug utilization review” (DUR). By law, the 
pharmacist has a corresponding responsibility with the prescriber to ensure that the prescriptions 
are safe and appropriate in the usual course of professional treatment. Any simple entry mistakes 
are sent back to the technician for corrections. Problems regarding DUR must be solved by the 
pharmacist before the prescription can continue to be filled, and are usually resolved in conjunction 
with the patient or provider. 
5. Product Verification: A pharmacist completes a final check on the filled prescription to 
assure the correct medication and amount appears in the bottle. Any mistakes are returned back 
for correction. 
6. Storage: If a patient/caregiver is not on location waiting for all prescriptions of a patient 
are ready, a technician packs them into a package. 
7. Prescription Retrieval: When a patient comes for picking up his medication package, a 
technician finds the package for the patient. 
8. Counseling: A pharmacist will offer counseling service if the patient does need it. 
9. Check-Out: The patient checks out with the cashier (technician), and leave. 
10. MTM Services: A service performed outside of the general prescription workflow 
(mostly on the phone) consisting of a TMR or a CMR. 
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In addition, there are many ancillary sub-processes that significantly affect the operations 
of a pharmacy. For instance, a pharmacy receives hundreds of phone calls every day from their 
patients, physicians, insurance company agents, and so on. Since pharmacists and technicians are 
usually very busy with their work, they tend to answer phone calls while working with 
prescriptions. A typical call is always first answered by a technician and, if the technician finds 
that the call must be answered by a pharmacist, a pharmacist will take over the phone call. The 
time spent by pharmacists and technicians attending those calls is a significant factor in the 
operations of the pharmacy, and results in considerable constraints on the availability of a 
pharmacist to provide MTM services.  
Another source of constraints for the overall performance of a pharmacy arises from 
intrinsic characteristics and potential problems associated with the orders. For instance, controlled 
substances need more time to be processed than non-controlled substance in most of the steps. 
Also, controlled substances are more likely to have insurance and DUR problems. Those problems 
are less likely to be resolved, leading to frequent prescription denials and later re-processing of the 
orders. There could also be delays due to lack of inventory after a prescription has been 
successfully billed through insurance; in that case the order is set aside to be completed the next 
day (effectively adding approximately 24 hours to the prescriptions overall completion time). 
3.3 Model Formulation 
We develop an optimization model for the scheduling of MTM services of a community 
pharmacy. We also propose a condition (see inequality (46)) to determine when economies of 
scope are achieved by providing prescription and MTM services at the same time. In our model, 
the output of the system and the loss opportunity cost from customers waiting are two key metrics 
to determine performance. However, since those metrics are stochastic in nature, we introduce a 
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Jackson queuing network framework (Shortle et al. 2018) to derive structural results for our model 
under a simplified setting. 
3.3.1 Queuing Network Model 
Based on the dynamics of a community pharmacy as described in the workflow from 
Section 3.2.2, setting a stochastic framework to assess system output and waiting time is a natural 
approach, and in particular, using a queuing network model of the process is an appropriate 
methodology. The resulting model is too complex to produce analytical results in general, but it is 
amenable for approximate solutions via simulation, as shown in Section 3.4, and for some analysis 
in simpler scenarios. 
For now, we assume that the pharmacy does not offer MTM services, so that it is a 
prescription-only system, and the resources do not answer phone calls while at work. In our model, 
there are two types of resources: pharmacists and technicians. Pharmacists can perform any of the 
workflow tasks, but technicians cannot perform tasks such as safety review, product verification, 
counseling, and providing MTM services. We use subscripts p and h to emphasize this dependence 
on the type of resource, pharmacist or technician, respectively. To generalize, we denote by K the 
set of all workflow tasks that are required for a prescription, and by Kh, 𝐾ℎ ⊂ 𝐾, the set of 
workflow tasks that can also be performed by technicians. In particular, we use index k = 1 to 
represent the counseling task (notice that 1 ∉ 𝐾ℎ). Let 𝜇𝑘 > 0 be the average service rate for task 
k (hence, 1/𝜇𝑘  is the average time to perform task k per prescription). We denote by 𝑒𝑘  the 
probability that an order has to be re-worked at task k because of an issue (e.g., there is a data entry 
mistake, prescription was incorrectly filled, etc.) The proportion of prescription patients that 
require counseling is denoted by f. We denote by 𝑛𝑝 ≥ 1 and 𝑛ℎ ≥ 1the number of pharmacists 
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and technicians available at the pharmacy, respectively. Notice that 𝑛ℎ can be zero, but 𝑛𝑝 has to 
be always positive to have a feasible system.  
We assume that arrival of patients with prescriptions follows a Poisson process with rate 
λ>0. The total workload in the system is then 
 System Load = 𝜆(
𝑓
𝜇1
+ ∑
1
(1− 𝑒𝑘)𝜇𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾\{1}
). (29) 
Hence, the utilization per resource is given by 
 
𝜌 ≔ Resource Utilization
=
𝜆
𝑛𝑝
(
𝑓
𝜇1
+ ∑
1
(1− 𝑒𝑘)𝜇𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾\(𝐾ℎ∪{1})
)+
𝜆
𝑛𝑝 + 𝑛ℎ
(∑
1
(1 − 𝑒𝑘)𝜇𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾ℎ
). 
(30) 
Therefore, for the system to be stable, we require 𝜌 < 1. 
Suppose that the system has reached steady-state. To assess system output during a time 
interval of size T, without loss of generality we assume that the system is empty at a fixed point in 
time, which we arbitrarily set as zero. Then, because of the Poisson process assumption, we obtain 
for sufficiently large T 
 Prescription Output ≈ λ𝑇 − 𝐿 = λ(𝑇 − 𝑊), (31) 
where (as usual) L is the expected number of customers in the system and W is the expected 
waiting time per user in the system. The last expression in (31) follows from Little’s law. 
3.3.2 MTM Effect 
As indicated in Section 3.2, there are two types of MTM services that a pharmacy can 
provide: targeted medication reviews (TMRs) or comprehensive medication reviews (CMRs). 
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Both types of services can only be performed by pharmacists, one pharmacist per review, and they 
are generally provided by phone. On the average, TMRs take about ten minutes per review, 
whereas CMRs take about 30 minutes per review. Both services can only be provided by a 
pharmacist who is idle, that is, who is not otherwise engaged working on prescriptions or any other 
high priority pharmacy task. Nevertheless, most community pharmacies require having at least 
two idle pharmacists at the same time before providing any CMR services, to ensure that there will 
be at least one pharmacist available to work on arriving high-priority prescriptions while the other 
pharmacist is busy with a CMR. 
 To model the pharmacy’s output when providing both prescription and MTM services, we 
assume that all the TMRs performed by a single pharmacist have random durations with a common 
exponential distribution with parameter β > 0, and those durations are stochastically independent 
of each other as random variables. We also assume that TMRs performed by one pharmacist are 
independent of the TMRs performed by another pharmacist. Let ∅𝑗  denote the steady-state 
probability that there are j busy pharmacists serving prescriptions in the network system described 
in the previous section (∑ ∅𝑗
𝑛𝑝
𝑗=0
= 1). Hence, the expected output in terms of number of reviews 
completed during a time interval of size T can be approximated as  
 TMR Output ≈ 𝛽𝑇 ∑ (𝑛𝑝 − 𝑗)∅𝑗 +1 −∅𝑛𝑝
𝑛𝑝−1
𝑗=0
= 𝛽𝑇(𝑛𝑝 − λ𝑙)+ 1− ∅𝑛𝑝 , (32) 
where 
 𝑙 =
𝑓
𝜇1
+ ∑
1
(1− 𝑒𝑘)𝜇𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾\(𝐾ℎ∪{1} )
 (33) 
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and 𝜆𝑙 is the average number of busy pharmacists (expected pharmacist offered load). Notice that  
𝜆𝑙 is independent of 𝑛𝑝 as long as the system is stable (𝜌 <  1), and that a stable system implies 
that 𝜆𝑙 < 𝑛𝑝 . On the other hand, the expected time required to complete those TMRs can be 
approximated as 
 TMR Time ≈
1
𝛽
∑
∅𝑗
𝑛𝑝 − 𝑗
+ 𝑇 (1 − ∅𝑛𝑝)
𝑛𝑝−1
𝑗=0
. (34) 
In particular, when the pharmacists are solely dedicated to provide TMR services (no 
prescriptions), we have ∅0 = 1 and ∅𝑗 = 0 for all j > 0. Hence, we obtain 
 TMR Only pharmacy Output ≈ 𝑛𝑝𝛽𝑇 + 1. (35) 
Similarly, assuming that the CMRs durations are independent and identically distributed 
with common exponential distribution with parameter 𝛾 >  0, the expected output (in number of 
reviews) and the expected time to complete CMRs during an interval of size T can be approximated 
as 
 
CMR Output ≈ 𝛾𝑇 ∑ (𝑛𝑝 − 𝑗)∅𝑗 +1 −∅𝑛𝑝 −∅𝑛𝑝−1
𝑛𝑝−2
𝑗=0
= 𝛾𝑇 (𝑛𝑝 − λ𝑙 − ∅𝑛𝑝−1) + 1 −∅𝑛𝑝 −∅𝑛𝑝−1 , 
(36) 
 CMR Time ≈
1
𝛾
∑
∅𝑗
𝑛𝑝 − 𝑗
+ 𝑇 (1 −∅𝑛𝑝 −∅𝑛𝑝−1)
𝑛𝑝−2
𝑗=0
, (37) 
provided that 𝑛𝑝 ≥ 2. If the pharmacists are solely dedicated to provide CMR services, we have 
 CMR −Only Output ≈ 𝑛𝑝𝛾𝑇 + 1. (38) 
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Going back to the system with pharmacists providing both prescription and TMR services, 
notice that the first term in equation (34) represents an additional time that arriving prescriptions 
will be delayed whenever not all pharmacists are engaged in serving prescriptions. In other words, 
whenever a new prescription arrives to the system it will find all pharmacists engaged in either 
serving another prescription or providing a TMR. Hence, the expected prescription output should 
be revised to 
 Revised Prescription Output ≈ 𝜆 (𝑇 −𝑊 −
1
𝛽
∑
∅𝑗
𝑛𝑝 − 𝑗
𝑛𝑝−1
𝑗=0
). (39) 
Similarly, if the pharmacists in the system provide both prescription and CMR services, 
the expected prescription output should be revised to 
          Revised Prescription Output ≈ 𝜆(𝑇 − 𝑊 −
1
𝛾
∑
∅𝑗
𝑛𝑝 − 𝑗
𝑛𝑝−2
𝑗=0
), (40) 
provided that 𝑛𝑝 ≥ 2. 
3.3.3 Economies of Scope 
Two simplify the analysis and the notation, in this section we assume that there are no 
technicians, that is,  𝑛ℎ = 0. Now suppose that the available resources (pharmacists) are split into 
separate and independent systems, one a prescription-only system with i pharmacists and the other 
a TMR-only system with 𝑛𝑝 − 𝑖 pharmacists, where 𝑖 ∈ {0,1,2,… , 𝑛𝑝} . In that case, following 
Baumol et al. (1982) and Panzar and Willig (1977, 1981), economies of scope are achieved if the 
expected revenues from the combined system (offering both prescription and TMR services at the 
same time) are greater than the sum of the expected revenues from the prescription-only and the 
TMR-only systems. To that end, let r and h be the (variable) revenue per unit of output from 
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prescriptions and TMRs, respectively. Let 𝜌𝑖  be the expected resource utilization in the 
prescription-only system with i pharmacists, that is, 𝜌𝑖 ≔ 𝜆𝑙/𝑖 for i > 0. We denote by 𝑊𝑖 the 
expected waiting-time for a prescription when there are i > 0 pharmacists in the prescription-only 
system.  
Since the business model of community pharmacies largely depends on maintaining good  
customer relationships, it is important to consider the effect of different policies on the quality of 
service. Generally, the duration of CMRs and TMRs exhibits little variability (small variance), so 
that the greatest effect on service quality originates from the time to fulfill a patient’s prescription 
and there could be opportunity costs from having large expected waiting times for prescriptions. 
We incorporate these costs to the model by introducing a cost denote by c > 0 and representing the 
system cost for every unit of expected time that a prescription waits in the network. Hence, add to 
our model the expected waiting cost per prescription 𝑐𝑊.  
Using equations (31), (32), (35), and (39), we obtain the following result.  
Proposition 1. Economies of scope for a community pharmacy offering both prescription and TMR 
services can be achieved if  
 𝑟𝜆 (∆𝑖𝑊−
𝐴
𝛽
)− 𝑐∆𝑖𝑊> ℎ(𝛽𝑇(𝜆𝑙 − 𝑖) + ∅𝑛𝑝), (41) 
for all 𝑖 ∈ {0,1,2,… , 𝑛𝑝 −1} such that  𝜌𝑖 < 1, and 
 ℎ (𝛽𝑇(𝑛𝑝−𝜆𝑙)+ 1−∅𝑛𝑝) > 𝑟𝜆
𝐴
𝛽
, (42) 
for 𝑖 = 𝑛𝑝 , where ∆𝑖𝑊 ≔ 𝑊𝑖 −𝑊𝑛𝑝 and  𝐴 ≔ ∑
∅𝑗
𝑛𝑝−𝑗
𝑛𝑝−1
𝑗=0
. 
The stability condition  𝜌𝑖 < 1 implies that  𝜆𝑙 < 𝑖 , so that to determine if economies of 
scope can be achieved, we only need to check that inequality (41) holds for resource partitions that 
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assign more than 𝜆𝑙 pharmacists to the prescription-only system. Also notice that ∆𝑖𝑊 > 0 since 
the expected waiting time is larger for prescription-only systems with fewer pharmacists (i.e., i 
decreases). Therefore, it follows that for 𝑖 < 𝑛𝑝, as 𝛽 increases the left-hand side of (41) increases 
to (𝑟𝜆 − 𝑐)∆𝑖𝑊, whereas the right-hand side of (41) decreases to −∞ ;  that is, as pharmacist  
efficiency in dealing with TMRs increases, economies of scope will be achieved, and a combined 
system will be optimal. From inequality (42), a similar result follows when 𝑖 = 𝑛𝑝 and 𝛽 is large.  
Now, let g > 0 be the revenue per unit of output from CMRs. An analogous result to 
Proposition 1 for the CMR case can also be obtained by combining equations (31), (36), (38), and 
(40), as follows. 
Proposition 2. Economies of scope for a community pharmacy offering both prescription and CMR 
services can be achieved if 
 𝑟𝜆 (∆𝑖𝑊−
𝐵
𝛾
) − 𝑐∆𝑖𝑊> 𝑔 (𝛾𝑇 (𝜆𝑙 − 𝑖 + ∅𝑛𝑝−1)+ ∅𝑛𝑝 +∅𝑛𝑝−1), (43) 
for all 𝑖 ∈ {0,1,2,… , 𝑛𝑝 −1} such that  𝜌𝑖 < 1, and 
 𝑟𝜆 (∆𝑖𝑊−
𝐵
𝛾
) − 𝑐∆𝑖𝑊> 𝑔 (𝛾𝑇 (𝜆𝑙 − 𝑖 + ∅𝑛𝑝−1)+ ∅𝑛𝑝 +∅𝑛𝑝−1), (44) 
for 𝑖 = 𝑛𝑝 , where ∆𝑖𝑊 ≔ 𝑊𝑖 −𝑊𝑛𝑝 and  𝐵 ≔
∑
∅𝑗
𝑛𝑝−𝑗
𝑛𝑝−2
𝑗=0 . 
3.3.4 Optimal MTM Scheduling 
 
We consider a time period consisting of T equal-size time slots indexed by 𝑡 ∈ {1,⋯ , 𝑇}. 
In most cases, the size of the time slots will correspond to a one-hour interval. For each time slot 
there are three associated binary decision variables: xt, yt, and zt, corresponding to whether the 
pharmacy offers prescription, CMR, or TMR services, respectively, during slot t. Notice that at 
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least one of those three services should be offered during every slot, so that we should have 𝑥𝑡 +
𝑦𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡 ≥ 1. 
Also notice that if CMR services are provided during a time slot (yt = 1), then at least one 
pharmacist is dedicating to providing prescriptions or TMR services during that time slot. We use 
x, y, and z to refer to array vectors of decision variables taking values in {0, 1}T. When y = z = 0, 
the pharmacy corresponds to a prescription-only system, whereas when x = 0, the pharmacy 
corresponds to an MTM-only system. 
There are two types of resources, pharmacists and technicians, but only pharmacists can 
provide MTM services. The service rate of each resource depends on the task to be performed. All 
pharmacy tasks can be performed by a pharmacist, but not all tasks can be performed by a 
technician. If there are K tasks to be performed, we denote by µpk and µhk the expected service 
times of a pharmacist and a technician while performing tasks k, respectively. For tasks that a 
technician cannot perform, we set µtk = 0. For each time slot, the arrival rate to the system is 
denoted by λt (Notation Summary can be found in Appendix B.1).  
We denote by v := [x, y, z] an array of decision vectors x, y, z, and by R(v), G(v), and H(v) 
the expected revenue generated from prescription, CMR, and TMR services, respectively, during 
the full period. The total expected revenue for the full period is R(v)+G(v)+H(v). The expected 
loss opportunity cost from customers waiting in the system is denoted by W(v). Hence, the 
corresponding optimization problem is 
 
(P) max Π(v) = R(v) + G(v) + H(v) − W(v), 
s.t.     xt + yt + zt ≥ 1,  
         for all t, xt, yt, zt ∈ {0, 1}. 
(45) 
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Following Baumol et al. (1982), Panzar and Willig (1977, 1981), economies of scope are 
achieved when there are optimal solutions x∗, y∗, and z∗ to problem P such that 
 Π(v*) > max{Π(x∗, 0, 0), Π(0, y∗, z∗)}, (46) 
where Π (x*, 0, 0) is the optimal profit from a prescription-only system and Π (0, y*, z*) is the 
optimal profit from an MTM-only system. In other words, inequality (33) indicates that there is a 
combination of prescription and MTM services offered by the same pharmacy that dominates over 
the optimal expected profits by dedicating all the resources available to running either the 
prescription-only or the MTM-only systems by themselves. 
An alternative condition, closer to the traditional formulation from Baumol et al. (1982), 
is that the available resources are split into separate and independent systems, one prescription-
only and the other MTM-only. In that case, we say that economies of scope are achieved if there 
exists a feasible solution v to problem P such that 
 𝛱 (𝐯∗) >  𝛱𝑆(𝑥
∗,0, 0) +𝛱𝑆 ̅(0,𝑦
∗, 𝑧∗), (47) 
for all non-trivial partition {𝑆, 𝑆̅} of the resources, where ΠS(x∗, 0, 0)is the optimal profit from a 
prescription-only system with resources S and ΠS(0, y∗, z∗) is the optimal profit from an MTM-
only system with resources 𝑆̅. 
3.4 Numerical Results 
We developed a continuous-time event-driven simulation model of a typical community 
pharmacy and evaluated different operational issues related to MTM. In Section 3.4.1, we describe 
our main assumptions and the baseline simulation model to compare different scenarios. In Section 
3.4.2, using our baseline model we study the effect of economies of scope on pharmacy operations 
by combining prescription and MTM services. In Section 3.4.3, we investigate pharmacy 
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performance sensitivity to resource allocation. In Section 3.4.4, we consider a hypothetical 
scenario where we add an independent call center to the baseline model and thus, assume that 
technicians and pharmacists do not process prescription calls. Finally, in Section 3.4.5, we analyze 
different policies concerning MTM services scheduling.  
3.4.1 Simulation Modeling Approach 
To assess different metrics and compare different scenarios, we first created a baseline 
model for a community pharmacy operations. In all the scenarios considered, we simulated for an 
eight-day period, with the first day as a warm-up to accelerate convergence to steady-state. In a 
Monte Carlo fashion, we generated random samples for each scenario by running 40 times our 
simulating algorithm and then, estimating metrics of interest by aggregating the results from 
individual simulation runs. We used Rockwell’s Arena simulation software to program all of our 
simulation models and generate statistical reports concerning estimates of expected profits, waiting 
time, and resource utilization.  
Our baseline model consists of a “prescription-only” workflow that only considers regular 
prescription patients and counseling patients (no MTM services are provided), with the same main 
steps as described in Section 3.3. In this model, we use a typical community pharmacy resource 
setting consisting of two full-time pharmacists and three full-time technicians available at all times. 
The simulated pharmacy operates fourteen hours a day, from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. and all leftover 
incomplete jobs from the previous day are continued on the next day. The arrival process consists 
of prescriptions patients (some of them might also require counseling) and non-prescription 
patients who are only seeking counseling. The arrival of patients of both kinds, prescription and 
counseling (non-prescription), is according to corresponding Poisson processes that vary on the 
arrival rate per hour, depending on whether arrivals occur during a peak-hour or a peak-day. The 
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pharmacy experiences peak-hours (e.g., 11 a.m. to 1 p.m., and 4 p.m. to 7 p.m.) as well as peak-
days (e.g., Monday, Tuesday, and Friday) during which the average arrival rates are increased 
above average. Regardless of whether is a peak or non-peak time period, the overall average arrival 
rate is 20 prescription patients per hour, and five counseling patients per hour. Prescription patients 
are further divided into two categories, waiters and non-waiters, based on whether a patient is 
waiting in-person at the pharmacy for their order to be fulfilled (waiters) or not (non-waiter). 
Pharmacists and technicians give priority to jobs from waiters.  
Concerning phone calls during the day, in our simulations we allow technicians and 
pharmacists to multi-task, that is, workers can pick a phone call at any time, even when working 
on other tasks that do not require to talk to patients. While answering a phone call, we assume that 
the efficiency of a worker is reduced by 75%. We also consider different parameters for each 
prescription, such as whether the prescription is a refill, a controlled substance, an eRx, a refill-to-
soon, out-of-stock, has insurance problems, has a DUR problem, and so on. Details about those 
parameters are provided in Appendix B.2, Appendix B.3, and Appendix B.4.  
Finally, tasks that need direct contact with patients, such as prescription drop off and 
picking up, have higher priorities, whereas tasks that can be processed in the background, have 
lower priorities. The pharmacy replenishes its inventory every day, and out-of-stock orders wait 
in process until inventory has arrived. 
To incorporate MTM services into our simulations, we take the baseline model as described 
above and allow the pharmacists to perform CMR and TMR services depending on certain 
constraints. We assume there are an unlimited number of CMR and TMR jobs to be performed 
during the simulation time frame. However, pharmacists are only allowed to provide those services 
when they are free of any other regular prescription tasks. In addition, pharmacist can only provide 
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MTM services before 7 p.m. Since CMR jobs take much more time and may lead to larger delays, 
in most of our scenarios pharmacists are only allowed to service those jobs between 1 and 4 p.m. 
(non-peak hours in an afternoon) every day. Furthermore, to avoid long waits for future arrivals of 
(higher priority) prescription patients, CMR jobs can only be served when there are at least two 
pharmacists not busy with prescription tasks. Pharmacists can use any available time not dedicated 
to prescription tasks to perform TMR services. 
In our computer simulation model, there are more than 450 task modules. The simulation 
model written in Arena shown in Figure 13. The green workflow tasks that can only be processed 
by pharmacists, while grey modules represent workflow tasks that are always processed by 
technicians. The tasks in red are processed either by technicians or by pharmacists. Orange 
modules describe the tasks processed by the computer system, which consume time but do not 
require human resources. Blue modules are for behaviors of patients, such as arriving or waiting 
at a pharmacy. Lastly, the yellow modules are for scheduling control, which notifies pharmacists 
and technicians to work on pre-scheduled tasks. 
 
Figure 13: Simulation model 
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3.4.2 Economies of Scope Analysis 
Although most community pharmacies have similar workflows, their workloads are 
significantly vary from one to another. There are busy pharmacies such as some CVS stores and 
Walgreens’ stores in urban areas, where prescriptions pileup, while there are less busy stores such 
as supermarket-affiliated pharmacies, where customers can always be served without waiting. 
Thus, we analyze scenarios where the arrival rates to a pharmacy increase up to a factor of 1.5 
times of its typical rate to see how it affects the performance over the base models. Since waiters 
are more sensitive to the waiting time, we present results both for general patients and just for 
waiters. (see Figure 14 and Figure 15).  
 
Figure 14: Waiting time of two baselines 
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Figure 15: Waiting time for waiters of two baselines 
Excluding outliers, who have out of stock or refill too soon problems, we find that both for 
waiters and general patients, the prescription-only model always gives shorter waiting times than 
the MTM models. With the arrival rate increases, the waiting times of the two models start to 
converge to each other. This means that in MTM model for large arrival rates, a pharmacy becomes 
too busy to do MTM, and essentially turns into a prescription-only pharmacy. In the figure, we see 
that the two baseline models converge at around 40% to 50% increase over the regular arrival rate. 
However, before arrivals reach the threshold of 40 % increase, the average waiting time of waiters 
decreases. In fact, when the arrival rate increases, a newly arrived patient is more likely to wait 
after another prescription patient than a CMR. This leads to less waiting time, because a CMR 
lasts much longer than a regular prescription patient.  
As the arrival rates increase, the net revenue of the pharmacy also increases (see Figure 
16). Doing both MTM and prescription gives almost 10% more net revenue than only doing 
prescription with arrival rates. The difference diminishes as arrivals go up. 
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Figure 16: Net Revenue of two baselines 
It is obvious from the figure above that more net revenue also means longer waiting time 
for patients. However, whether it is worth to sacrifice customer service for net revenue really 
depends on how a pharmacy owner weights the two sides. To incorporate customer service, we 
introduce the normalized revenue, 𝜋 = 𝛼𝑅 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑊 as where R is the net revenue and W is 
the waiting time. 𝛼 is the weight factor of net revenue, and is between 0 and 1. In Figure 17, We 
plot an indifference curve of 𝛼 between the prescription-only model and the MTM model with 
respect to the percentage increase of arrival rates. We find that the curve is monotonic increasing. 
In the area above the indifference curve, where net revenue is more highly weighted, a pharmacy 
should offer both MTM and prescription services rather than prescription only. It also means that 
when a pharmacy has an 𝛼 above the indifference curve, economies of scope occur in pharmacy 
operations.  
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Figure 17: Indifference curve between two baselines 
3.4.3 Resource Allocation Sensitivity 
The allocation of personnel is another major concern of a pharmacy. An increasing number 
of resources (technicians and pharmacists) might potentially increase the revenue and improve the 
service, while it also incurs additional cost. Thus, it is important to determine whether the net 
revenue is sensitive to the number of resources assigned. Using on the two baseline models, we 
compare the net revenues and waiting time in scenarios with different number of resources, (see 
Figure 18 and Figure 19). 
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Figure 18: Net Revenue of different resource allocation 
 
Figure 19: Waiting time of different resource allocation 
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pharmacy is very sensitive to the number of pharmacists working there. This means that in typical 
pharmacy’s operations, pharmacists are the bottleneck and not the technicians. When there is one 
fewer pharmacist, the net revenue level drops about 37% and the waiting time increases 273%. 
When one more pharmacist is assigned, the MTM model and the prescription model show different 
results. In the MTM model, net revenue increases 19%, while in the prescription-only model, net 
revenue does not increase. The waiting time analysis shows that an additional pharmacist does not 
decrease the waiting time for an MTM and prescription pharmacy, but it can reduce the waiting 
time by 28% in the prescription only model. Thus, we can conclude that for a typical community 
pharmacy, the operations manager can cut one technician with no extra cost. It is also worth it to 
consider adding a pharmacist if he wants to incorporate MTM services. 
 
Figure 20: Normalized revenue of an additional pharmacist 
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Figure 21: Value of an additional pharmacist 
Pharmacists are the most important resources in a pharmacy. Adding an additional 
pharmacist can increase the normalized revenue of a pharmacy with respect to the value of α, (see 
Figure 20). Based on the increase of the normalized revenue, a pharmacy operations manager can 
easily calculate the dollar value of a pharmacist, (see Figure 21). Thus, a pharmacy operations 
manager should hire an additional pharmacist if the salary of the pharmacist falls below the curves 
in Figure 21. We find that both the normalized revenue and the dollar value from adding an 
additional pharmacist decrease when more pharmacists have been added to the pharmacy, which 
also agrees with the law of diminishing marginal utility. 
Different pharmacies have different sensitivities to incorporating MTM services. It is of 
the operations manager’s interest to find whether his pharmacy can benefit from offering MTM 
services. We compare the effects of incorporating MTM into prescription-only pharmacies and 
observe the change in both net revenue and waiting time, (see Figure 22). We found that a 
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pharmacy with has two pharmacists and three technicians benefits the most from incorporating 
MTM services, while pharmacies with only one pharmacists are worse off when adding MTM. 
 
Figure 22: Effects of Incorporating MTM Services 
3.4.4 Call Center Effect 
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non-waiters in the two baseline models decreases by about 17%. Obviously, call centers reduce 
the burden of the pharmacy operations. Since a call center does not increase patient visits, net 
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valuable to an MTM and prescription together model than to a prescription-only model. We draw 
two graphs to show the value of a call center with respect to 𝛼, (see Figure 25 and Figure 26). The 
difference between the two lines in Figure 25 is the value of a call center in terms of normalized 
revenue. In Figure 26, it shows the dollar value of a call center with respect to 𝛼. If a call center 
charges less than that value, it is worth to outsource all phone calls to the call center. 
 
Figure 23: Waiting time of call centers 
 
Figure 24: Net revenue of call centers 
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Figure 25: Difference in Normalized Revenue of a call center 
 
Figure 26: Call center value  
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3.4.5 MTM Scheduling 
We try to determine the best scheduling policy for MTM services by considering several 
scenarios with different times to provide CMR and TMR services. In the baseline model, we only 
allow pharmacists to practice CMR during non-peak hours in each afternoon and when they are 
free, and the rest of the free time before 7 pm is used to exercise TMRs. We also consider following 
scenarios (see Figure 27):  
• All day TMR-only 
• All day CMR only 
• All day prescription and TMR 
• MTM baseline 
• All-day prescription with all-day TMR and CMR in both morning and afternoon in 
non-peak hours 
• All-day prescription with all-day CMR 
 
Figure 27: Change in Revenue and Waiting Time 
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From Figure 27, we find that in a prescription and MTM together pharmacy, the more hours 
available for CMR service, the more net revenue the pharmacy could make. Compared to TMR, 
CMR leads to higher net revenue, while increasing the waiting time more than TMR. As we can 
see from Figure 27, CMR affects the waiting time more on non-waiters, while the increase of 
waiting time for waiters is not large. So giving pharmacists enough freedom to do CMR agrees 
with the target of a better pharmacy performance. Even though offering MTM services can yield 
a pharmacy more net revenue, the net revenue yielded by an MTM-only pharmacy is still no match 
to an MTM and prescription together pharmacy. This also shows that, economies of scope do exit 
in pharmacy’s operations, in accordance with our previous results. 
3.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
We have studied the prescription process in community pharmacies incorporating MTM 
services. We developed both a queuing model and a scheduling model driven by actual system and 
decision dynamics. We created a simulation model based on our theoretical models in a real 
pharmacy setting. Our results show that a typical community pharmacy still has almost 40% 
working capacity not been used. We find that after introducing MTM, the change in net revenue 
and waiting time is significantly affected by increasing arrival rates, number of pharmacists, and 
MTM scheduling. Based on that, we further discovered the conditions under which economies of 
scope do exist. In addition, we investigated the bottleneck in the prescription system and 
determined the loss or benefit of assigning different numbers of pharmacists. Then we studied the 
effects of having a call center. We found that a call center benefits a pharmacy with MTM services 
more than a prescription-only pharmacy. Based on our calculations, we determined the value of a 
call center. Further, we discussed different MTM scheduling scenarios, and we found that a 
pharmacy benefits when pharmacists are given more freedom to practice CMRs. 
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Chapter 4. An Empirical Investigation of the Decline of Emergency Service Departments in 
the U.S. 
4.1 Introduction 
Emergency departments (EDs) in the U.S. are usually extremely busy. A patient often has 
to wait for a long time to get emergency care. Generally, the price of a similar service in an 
emergency department is higher than that in a regular clinic. As a result, hospitals should have 
more motivation to allocate more medical personnel, and medical resources to emergency 
departments, leading to better service and less waiting time; however, this is not the reality. For 
instance, between 1996 and 2009, emergency room visits increased 51% from 90 million to 136 
million, while there were 290 emergency departments closed (Kaplan, 2014). Currently, the 
situation is even getting worse. The increasing demand and decreasing supply make very busy EDs 
even busier. This phenomenon leads to the following questions: what are the causes for the 
separation of the demand and the supply in an open market? If we can find such causes, are there 
any way to remit the situation? Do those hospitals, which maintain their emergency departments, 
benefit from the less competition? Do they increase medical resources assigned to emergency 
rooms, such as bed capacity, or medical personnel? If the decline in emergency departments does 
not benefit the society, how can we determine future policy to balance the difference in the supply 
and demand? Has Obamacare (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) had any impact on 
this trend? In this research, we will try to answers those questions. We will develop empirical 
models to investigate the potential reasons behind this decline and test our results. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
Given the large body of literature on healthcare, we limit our review to papers closely 
related to emergency department and hospital performance.  
4.2.1 Emergency Department Operations 
Many papers study the ED crowding problem, focusing on the reasons or the characteristics 
of this phenomenon. Bayley et al. (2005) tested the association between emergency department 
length of stay, and revenue of a hospital in chest pain patients. They found that financially a 
hospital emergency room does not have a direct benefit or loss from its crowding, but it may lose 
potential revenue, if the hospital is crowded. Rust et al. (2009) studied the association between 
community health centers and emergency departments used by both insured and uninsured patients 
in rural areas. They found that the presence of community health centers significantly affects the 
utilization of emergency departments, indicating the existence of abuse of emergency departments 
by uninsured patients. Buesching et al. (1985), analyzed the phenomena of inappropriate 
emergency department visits. In the study, he listed the main reasons for inappropriate emergency 
department visits. In addition, they tested the ratio differences between different classifications of 
patients, by gender, age employment status, and so on. They found that unemployed people are 
more likely to have inappropriate visits. Padgett et al. (1995) surveyed the usage of emergency 
rooms among the homeless people in New York City. They found that lower alcohol dependence, 
health symptoms and injuries were strong predictors for the probability that a homeless person 
would visit an emergency department. Cunningham (2006) studied the difference in emergency 
rooms by using different factors in U.S. He found that people who have Medicaid or Medicare are 
more likely to visit emergency departments, while people without insurance are unlikely to result 
in higher ED visits. Hsia et al. (2011) collected the data of hospitals in U. S. from 1990 to 2007. 
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They tested the association between the closure of emergency departments and factors such as 
competition, demographics, and hospital characteristics. 
4.2.2 Hospital Performance 
With respect to papers about hospital performance, they usually concentrate on how to 
improve the performance and hospitals’ reaction to their performance. Watkins (2000) used the 
nonfinancial data of hospitals to study their financial performance. She found  that hospital level 
nonfinancial data could reveal even more hidden performance information than actual financial 
data. Bazzoli and Andes (1995) found that when a hospital has financial distress, it has a higher 
likelihood of system acquisition and merger. Growing competition is the major factor for the 
closure of its services. However, a hospital would still keep its operation without dramatic change 
when it is in financial distress. Hibbard et al. (2009) collected hospital data from Wisconsin to find 
the effect of hospital performance reports on hospitals. The study shows that releasing hospital 
performance information to public can stimulate performance improvement in the long term for a 
hospital. Miller (2012) researched the health reform in Massachusetts in 2006 that required all 
state residents to have health insurance. He found that the reform increased the insured rate and 
decreased the emergency department use of the state. 
4.3 Research Context 
In this section, we will discuss the factors affecting the number of emergency departments, 
emergency department visits and financial performance. We want to determine factors that affect 
the number of emergency departments and the impact of Affordable Care Act. To do so, we 
collected data from 2001-2017 the American Hospital Association (AHA) Hospital Statistics. 
AHA conducts an annual survey of hospitals in the United States. The statistics include all the 
state-level hospital data in the U.S. The data contain information about hospitals’ utilization, 
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revenue and expenses, and number of hospitals in each category. We also collected data from the 
Census Bureau as our control variables, such as average household income, and unemployment 
rate, (see Appendix C.1.). The descriptive statistics of key variables are shown in Appendix C.2. 
4.3.1 Emergency Departments 
In this section, we put forward four hypotheses about the change in the number of 
emergency departments. Whether to close or open an emergency department for a hospital is not 
an easy decision. A hospital has to perform a comprehensive financial study involving the 
personnel, medical resources, investment, and so on, to or from the emergency department. Once 
a decision is made, a hospital cannot change its course of action easily. Thus, a hospital would not 
decide whether to close or open an emergency department just based on its performance in the 
previous year, but based on a series of previous annual performances. After the decision is made, 
a hospital cannot act immediately as well. Usually, the decision leads to a series of adjustments, 
which take much time and need a lot of coordination, including personnel rearrangement, facilities 
reassignment, contracts updates with physicians and insurance companies and so on. Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect that the change in the number of emergency departments depends on 
hospitals’ previous conditions as of at the least two years before.  
Since the number of hospitals differs across states depending on the size of the population 
of the state, we use two measures to study changes in the number of emergency departments per 
state: the ratio of the number of emergency departments to the size of the population (ED density) 
and the percentage of community hospitals that have emergency departments (ED percentage). 
Density measures the rarity of emergency departments in a state. The percentage of community 
hospitals with emergency departments, focuses on the problem from the hospital’s point of view, 
showing the willingness of a hospital to keep an emergency department open.  
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Financial Impact on the Number of Emergency Departments 
After considering potential reasons for hospitals closing their emergency departments, we 
concluded that financial stress might be one of the most important reasons, because the emergency 
departments significantly contribute to operating cost, thus yielding less profit. Hypothesis H1 
refers to how financial performance would affect the number of emergency departments. 
Generally, when hospitals’ financial performance is good, they would be likely to have more 
investment and more balanced services, leading hospitals to be bigger and more comprehensive. 
Thus, we hypothesize that the more profitability hospitals obtain in previous years, the longer they 
will maintain their emergency departments. However, hospitals may not invest on emergency 
departments linearly with their financial performance. They are more likely to invest on services 
that are more profitable firstly. After those services are fully funded, hospitals would switch their 
focus to investment in unprofitable services. Thus, to model such an effect, we add a quadratic 
term based on the financial performance into the hypothesis so that we can know whether 
emergency departments are sources of high or low profitability. Many indexes can be used to 
describe financial performance. Here we use profitability, which is calculated by dividing the total 
profit by the size of hospitals in a state. As mentioned earlier, we use density and percentage of 
EDs as dependent variables. Therefore, we have two sub- hypotheses: 
H1a: For additional profitability obtained two years ago, the density of emergency departments 
increases faster in hospitals with high profitability than in hospitals with low profitability. 
H1b: For additional profitability obtained two years ago, the percentage of hospitals that have 
emergency departments increases faster in hospitals with high profitability than in hospitals 
with low profitability. 
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Medical Resources Impact on the Number of Emergency Departments 
Compared to the difficulties of closing emergency departments based on financial 
performance, the decision of reallocating the existing medical resources is much easier. It is 
obvious that hospitals have more incentives to assign more resources to departments that are more 
profitable . Thus, to capture this effect, we add a quadratic term based on medical resources into 
the hypothesis as well, and then we can figure out whether emergency departments are a priority 
for the hospital. To describe the size of a hospital, we will use the number of beds in the hospital 
as the indicator. When the ratio of beds to population is high, that means that medical resources 
are sufficient in this state. Thus, we use the ratio of beds to population as the proxy for medical 
resources. Now we have two sub- hypotheses: 
H2a: For additional medical resources obtained two years ago, the density of emergency 
departments increases faster in hospitals with high medical resources than in hospitals with 
low medical resources. 
H2b: For additional medical resources obtained two years ago, the percentage of hospitals that 
have emergency departments increases faster in hospitals with high medical resources than 
in hospitals with low medical resources. 
Competition Impact on Number of Emergency Departments 
Competition is always an important factor to be considered. Previous literature shows 
competition is one of the major reasons for emergency department closures. As we know, 
emergency departments in the U.S. are very crowded. However, some hospitals closed their 
emergency departments instead of maintaining them. Some of them even announced that the 
closure would not affect emergency service in its local area, because there were other facilities that 
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could offer urgent care services. The explanation sounds reasonable, but contradicts the 
phenomenon that emergency departments are always busy. Testing whether competition is a real 
reason for the closure of emergency departments can help us understand the process. If what 
hospital claimed is true, we would find that when the competition is fierce there would be fewer 
emergency departments. However, this statement may just be an excuse to justify the closure. On 
the other hand, it is also possible that emergency departments can focus on patients who really 
need their help and thus can be more effective if there are other facilities which can share the 
burden. Therefore, we put forward two pairs of mutually exclusive hypotheses and try to explore 
which case works. Since most of the emergency department visits are not life threatening and can 
be also treated appropriately by urgent care centers, it is reasonable to believe that urgent care 
centers lead the competition against emergency departments. Thus, here we use the density of 
urgent care centers as an indicator of competition, which is calculated by dividing the number of 
urgent care center by the population. 
H3a-1: The higher the density of urgent care centers a state has, the lower the density of emergency 
departments in that state.  
H3a-2: The higher the density of urgent care centers a state has, the higher the density of 
emergency departments in that state.  
H3b-1: The higher the density of urgent care centers a state has, the lower the percentage of 
emergency departments in that state.  
H3b-2: The higher the density of urgent care centers a state has, the higher the percentage of 
emergency departments in that state.  
Impact of Trends Difference on the Number of Emergency Departments 
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The U.S. emergency departments are getting busier and busier. This is mainly due to the 
dramatic change in the emergency department visits. Based on this change, many states reacted 
differently. Some of them increased their number of emergency departments to compensate for the 
increase, while some of them did not show a significant trend in increasing or decreasing the 
number of emergency departments, while others had a decreasing trend in the number of 
emergency departments. These differences could be led by the different policies in each state. 
Thus, the marginal effects from independent variables may vary. Here we will compare the 
declining- and increasing-trend groups. 
Summarizing all the previous hypotheses, we obtain the following regression models for 
emergency departments: 
 
𝐸𝐷 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 +𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−2
2
+ 𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−2 +𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−2
2
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−2 +𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼𝑖 +𝜃𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−2 
(48) 
 𝐸𝐷 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−2
2
+ 𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−2 +𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−2
2
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−2 +𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼𝑖 +𝜃𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−2 
(49) 
In the models, i represent the state and t represent year t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡−2 is a vector of the control 
variables. 𝛼𝑖 is the fixed effect of state i, and 𝜃𝑡−2 is the fixed effect of year t-2.  
4.3.2 Outpatient Visits 
We will test hypotheses about the number of outpatient visits. Although the number of 
outpatient visits is not the focus of this study, comparing to the trend of change of emergency 
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department visits can help us understand the behavior from the patient side. Since outpatient visits 
are composed of the emergency department visits and other outpatient visits, we will treat them 
separately. Just like the number of emergency departments, the number of emergency department 
visits and the number of other outpatient visits are also dependent on the population of a state. 
Therefore, we use the number of corresponding visits per 1000 people as indicators of both 
emergency department visits and other outpatient visits, respectively. We are not only interested 
in the number of emergency department visits, but also in the ratio of emergency department visits 
and other outpatient visits, since it can tell us whether a certain factor can make some patients go 
to an emergency department instead of going to a primary care provider, or a policy would have 
different effects on emergency department visits and other outpatient visits. 
Medical Resource on Number of Outpatient Visits 
When more medical resources are available to each patient, hospitals can provide better 
medical services, which means patients can receive care more appropriately. Consequently, 
patients may be more willing to visit a hospital under those circumstances, even when their health 
problems are not that bad. Therefore, a better medical environment may induce more hospital 
visits. However, it is also possible that the presence of more medical resources indicates that the 
state already has more than enough capacity. As a result, the number of hospital visits would not 
go up with an increase of medical resources in those states. Under this situation, more medical 
resources indicates a healthier state, which leads to fewer hospital visits. Thus, we also add a 
quadratic term to describe this potential phenomenon. Therefore, we have the following 
hypotheses: 
H4a-1: For additional medical resources, the number of ED Visits increases slower in hospitals 
with high medical resources than in hospitals with low medical resources. 
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H4a-2: For additional medical resources, the number of ED Visits increases faster in hospitals with 
high medical resources than in hospitals with low medical resources. 
H4b-1: For additional medical resources, the number of Other Visits increases slower in hospitals 
with high medical resources than in hospitals with low medical resources. 
H4b-2: For additional medical resources, the number of Other Visits increases faster in hospitals 
with high medical resources than in hospitals with low medical resources. 
H4c-1: For additional medical resources, the Ratio of Other Visits & ED Visits increases slower 
in hospitals with high medical resources than in hospitals with low medical resources. 
H4c-2: For additional medical resources, the Ratio of Other Visits & ED Visits increases faster in 
hospitals with high medical resources than in hospitals with low medical resources. 
Summarizing, we obtain the following regression models: 
 
𝐸𝐷 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝛼𝑖
+𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(50) 
 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 +𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 +𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡
+𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(51) 
 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 +𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 +𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡
+𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(52) 
4.3.3 Financial Performance 
Financial performance is always a major concern of any enterprise. For a hospital, 
optimizing its operation process and treating patients effectively are important ways to improve its 
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financial performance. We explore the factors associated with financial performance here. In this 
section, we will put forward hypotheses about the financial performance of hospitals in a state. To 
measure financial performance, we employ two indexes from two different dimensions, 
profitability and profit rate. Profitability shows the unit monetary yield from an additional medical 
resource, which can be calculated by dividing the net profit by the number of patient beds in a 
state. Profit rate is the ratio between profit and revenue, which shows the efficacy of operations.  
Number of Outpatient Visits Impact on Financial Performance 
Patients are customers of hospitals. No matter whether patients pay by themselves from 
their own pockets or through their insurance, hospitals offer services and collect money from 
patient visits. As we discussed above, different kinds of patients contribute differently to financial 
performance. More emergency department visits may lead to more reduction in revenue, lowering 
profitability and profit rate, while other outpatient visits are not subjected to this problem. To verify 
the idea, we want to determine whether emergency department visits and other outpatient visits 
yield different profit. Generally, when hospitals have more patient visits, they would be more likely 
to have better profitability. However, since some patients may delay or refuse to pay their bill, the 
more patient visits can also lead to worse profitability. Thus, we hypothesize that the number of 
patient visits is associated with hospitals’ financial performance. When there are more patients 
visiting hospitals, financial performance of hospitals may not change linearly. Therefore, we add 
quadratic term of financial performance into the hypothesis too. So, we have four sub- hypotheses: 
H5a-1: For an additional emergency department visit, Profitability of hospitals increases slower in 
hospitals with more emergency department visits than in hospitals with fewer emergency 
department visits. 
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H5a-2: For an additional emergency department visit, Profitability of hospitals increases faster in 
hospitals with more emergency department visits than in hospitals with fewer emergency 
department visits. 
H5b-1: For an additional emergency department visit, Profit rate of hospitals increases slower in 
hospitals with more emergency department visits than in hospitals with fewer emergency 
department visits. 
H5b-2: For an additional emergency department visit, Profit rate of hospitals increases faster in 
hospitals with more emergency department visits than in hospitals with fewer emergency 
department visits. 
H5c-1: For an additional other outpatient visit, Profitability of hospitals increases slower in 
hospitals with more other outpatient visits than in hospitals with fewer other outpatient 
visits. 
H5c-2: For an additional other outpatient visit, Profitability of hospitals increases faster in 
hospitals with more other outpatient visits than in hospitals with fewer other outpatient 
visits. 
H5d-1: For an additional other outpatient visit, Profit rate of hospitals increases slower in hospitals 
with more other outpatient visits than in hospitals with fewer other outpatient visits. 
H5d-2: For an additional other outpatient visit, Profit rate of hospitals increases faster in hospitals 
with more other outpatient visits than in hospitals with fewer other outpatient visits. 
Summarizing, we botain the following regression models: 
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 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1𝐸𝐷 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐷 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
+𝛽4𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(53) 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +𝛽2𝐸𝐷 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(54) 
4.3.4 Affordable Care Act 
The Affordable Care Act was approved in 2010. It mainly aimed to increase efficiency of 
the healthcare system in the U.S. Although the act was controversial, a series of actions had gone 
into effect. The direst result is that the uninsured rate in the U.S. dropped after the Affordable Care 
Act went into effect. As we discussed before, in recent years the number of the U.S. emergency 
departments declined while the emergency department visits increased. However, after the launch 
of the Affordable Care Act, the tendency may have changed. Thus, we would like to explore 
whether the Act has affected the number of emergency departments. Though ACA is a law, which 
applied to all the states in the same way, the impacts of each state may differ from each other. One 
of the most important provisions in ACA was to punish people who did not have healthcare 
insurance. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that ACA has stronger impact on states whose insurance 
rate is low, and has a weaker effect on states whose insurance rate is high. In our model, we also 
consider the effect of Medicare expansion. Medicare expansion is a provision in the Affordable 
Care Act, which expands Medicaid eligibility to cover more low-income population. It expands 
Medicaid eligibility to people whose income is less than 138 percent of the federal poverty level. 
Though ACA went into effect for all the states following the same timetable, whether to launch, 
and when to launch Medicaid expansion is the decision of the each state. The application of 
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Medicaid expansion can really help to achieve the goal of ACA. From what we have discussed 
now, we establish our extended model with ACA and Medicare expansion. 
 𝐸𝐷 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1(𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡)
+ 𝛽3(𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +𝛽7𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +𝜃𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(55) 
Since we assume that ACA had a great effect on states that have high-uninsured rate, we 
use the uninsured rate of 2013 as the baseline, which is the year before ACA went effective. In the 
model, 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013  is the indicator of the baseline of uninsured rate in 2013. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 indicates 
whether ACA is effective and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 whether Medicare expansion has been accept in state i 
in year t.  
𝛽2 represents the direct effect of Medicare expansion with ACA. 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013  is the 
effect of the modification effect by Medicare expansion. So, overall, we have 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013  
is the effect of the ACA without Medicare expansion, while 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013 +𝛽2 +
𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑2013  is the effect with Medicare expansion. 
4.4 Analysis 
4.3.1 Emergency Departments  
From Table 1 and Table 2, we find that the financial impact does not have a significant 
effect on both the density and percentage of emergency departments in a state. This means that a 
hospital’s decision about whether to open or close an emergency department is not dependent on 
the hospital’s financial situation. In fact, to open or close an emergency department is a big 
decision for a hospital. The process and the resource rearrangement sometimes cost a hospital a 
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lot. An inappropriate decision may lead to even greater financial burden. Thus, it is reasonable for 
a hospital not to use its profitability as the direct signal for its decision. 
Table 1: Details of hypotheses for density of emergency departments 
 All States 
Positive Trend 
States 
Negative Trend 
States 
Profitability (Linear) 
-4.6×10-9 2.94×10-8 -1.7×10-8 
(6.2×10-9) (2.1×10-8) (1.38×10-8) 
Profitability (Quadratic) 
-1.4×10-14 -1.8×10-13 9.85×10-14 
(4.53×10-14) (1.7×10-13) (1.01×10-13) 
Medical Resources (Linear) 
-9.81×10-
3*** 
-2.1×10-3 -1.02×10-2** 
(1.77×10-3) (9.91×10-3) (4.48×10-3) 
Medical Resources 
(Quadratic) 
1.83×10-3*** 6.62×10-5 2.05×10-3*** 
(2.08×10-4) (1.39×10-3) (5.3×10-4) 
Density of Urgent Care Center 
0.189*** -0.236 0.281 
(0.0692) (0.374) (0.184) 
Constant 
2.02×10-2*** 9.88×10-3 1.49×10-2 
(3.63×10-3) (1.98×10-2) (9.49×10-3) 
N 612 84 156 
* indicates p-value p<0.1  ** indicates p-value p<0.05  *** indicates p-value p<0.01 
On the contrary, the coefficients of the medical resource impact are significant for both 
linear and quadratic terms no matter the density or the percentage of the emergency department in 
Table 1 and Table 2. We find that the signs of the linear and quadratic terms are opposite where 
the linear terms are negative and the quadratic terms are positive. This indicates that when there is 
more medical resource available for each person in a state, hospitals are more willing to use them 
in non-emergency departments in the first place. As the medical resources become more abundant, 
Yucheng Chen - University of Connecticut, 2019 
81 
 
hospitals have more incentives to allocate medical resources to emergency departments than they 
would invest at the beginning. Combining the results that we get from financial impact, we learn 
that hospitals are more interested in other regular medical services than in emergency room service. 
It is not easy for hospitals to open or close emergency departments just based on their financial 
situation, while it is more likely for a hospital to allocate medical resources in an unequal way, 
which would help the hospital yield more profit safely. 
Table 2: Details of hypotheses for percentage of emergency departments 
 All States Positive Trend States Negative Trend States 
Profitability (Linear) 
-2.1×10-8 1.31×10-6 -9.39×10-7** 
(2.41×10-7) (9.1×10-7) (4.2×10-7) 
Profitability (Quadratic) 
-1.1×10-13 -7.6×10-12 5.05×10-12* 
(1.76×10-12) (7.4×10-12) (3.03×10-12) 
Medical Resources 
-0.174** -0.178 0.0446 
(0.0689) (0.43) (0.135) 
Medical Resources (Quadratic) 
0.0267*** 0.0144 0.00578 
(0.00808) (0.0601) (0.0158) 
Density of Urgent Care Center 
8.433*** -16.15 6.992 
(2.686) (16.24) (5.539) 
Constant 
1.059*** 1.361 0.206 
(0.141) (0.862) (0.285) 
N 612 84 156 
* indicates p-value p<0.1  ** indicates p-value p<0.05  *** indicates p-value p<0.01 
In the test, we used urgent care center as the proxy for competition. Many hospitals justify 
the closure of their emergency department as eliminating surplus capability of urgent care. 
However, from the Table 1 and Table 2, we obtain the opposite. We find that if the density of 
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urgent care centers is increased by 1 unit, there is 0.189 more units of emergency departments in 
density in the state. Similarly, when the density of urgent care centers is higher, the percentage of 
hospitals that have emergency departments is also higher. Generally, the results show that 
competition is not a real reason for the decline in the number of emergency departments. Instead, 
the so-called competition is a boost for the number of emergency departments, since when there 
are more urgent care centers, more non-emergency patients may go to urgent care centers, making 
emergency departments more likely to only treat patient who really need emergency treatment. 
Among most of the states, the workload of emergency departments has increased 
dramatically in recent years. This is mainly due to the great increase in the number of emergency 
department visits. However, a slight decline in the number of emergency departments is another 
reason. Here we divide the states into two different groups. One is the states that have significant 
increasing trends in the number of emergency departments, and the other is the group of states that 
have significant declining trends in the number of emergency departments. We compare the 
difference in the sensitivity of those variables in different groups. We find that the difference 
between increasing-trend states and declining-trend states lays in the impact of a hospital’s 
financial performance and medical resources. If a state has an increasing number of emergency 
departments, then it is not so sensitive to the change in profit and medical resources, whereas if a 
state has a declining number of emergency departments, then it is more sensitive to these two 
factors. The declining-trend states are more likely to close their emergency departments, while 
their financial performance is not good, leading to a low percentage of emergency departments. 
Also the density of emergency departments is more likely to be affected by the medical resources 
in the state. 
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4.3.2 Outpatient Visits 
The impact of the coefficients corresponding to medical resources on the number of 
outpatient visits is significant for only the linear terms, as shown in Table 3. This indicates that 
when medical resources are abundant, there would be fewer hospital outpatient visits. However, 
for the ratio of the two kinds of visits, the result is not significant. Therefore, when there is a change 
in medical resources, both types of visits increase, but the ratio of the visits stays constant. It is 
reasonable for patients to base their decision to visit a hospital on whether the hospital has enough 
medical resources instead of considering emergency and outpatient departments separately. 
Table 3: Details of hypotheses for number of outpatient visits 
 ED Visits Other Visits Ratio of Other Visits & ED Visits 
Medical Resources (Linear) 
-66.60** -454.9* 0.057 
(27.65) (233.4) (0.493) 
Medical Resources (Quadratic) 
-1.534 -7.696 -0.0161 
(3.282) (27.7) (0.0585) 
Constant 
447.0*** 2958.7*** 6.090*** 
(55.4) (467.7) (0.988) 
N 714 714 714 
* indicates p-value p<0.1  ** indicates p-value p<0.05  *** indicates p-value p<0.01 
4.3.3 Financial Performance 
From Table 4, we find that the number of outpatient visits does not have a significant 
association with profit rate, but it does with profitability. For profitability, emergency department 
visits can affect the financial performance both for the linear and the quadratic terms but not for 
other outpatient visits. This result agrees with our first conclusion, which shows that emergency 
department visits are not as profitable as other types of hospital visits. Since the linear and the 
quadratic terms have opposite signs, where the linear term is positive and the quadratic term is 
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negative, we conclude that even when emergency department visits few, hospitals still benefit. 
Too many emergency department visits indicates more unnecessary visits, which lowers the 
hospital’s profitability.  
Table 4: Details of hypotheses for financial performance 
 Profitability Profit Rate 
Medical Resource(Linear) 
-65059.0*** 2.23×10-3 
(23613.0) (0.0102) 
Medical Resource (Quadratic) 
6527.6** 5.13×10-4 
(2775.5) (1.20×10-3) 
ED Visits (Linear) 
295.4** 9.07×10-5 
(140.3) (6.08×10-5) 
ED Visits (Quadratic) 
-0.263** -7.21×10-8 
(0.129) (5.61×10-8) 
Other Visits(Linear) 
21.76 2.07×10-7 
(15.63) (6.78×10-6) 
Other Visits (Quadratic) 
-0.00378 -7.98×10-10 
(2.78×10-3) (1.21×10-9) 
Constant 
157841.5** 8.66×10-3 
(65485.0) (0.0284) 
N 714 714 
* indicates p-value p<0.1  ** indicates p-value p<0.05  *** indicates p-value p<0.01 
4.3.4 Affordable Care Act 
From Table 5, we find that all the coefficients related to Affordable Care Act are 
significant. It proves ACA does affect the density of emergency rooms of a state. After ACA is 
launched, states without Medicaid expansion get 2.46×10-4×Uninsured2013 more emergency 
departments per 1000 population on average, while states with Medicaid expansion get 6.8708×10-
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3-1.597×10-4Uninsured2013 more emergency departments per 1000 population on average. From 
this result, we see that implementation of ACA did have a significant impact on the number of 
emergency departments in a state. We take Alaska as an example; the impact of ACA is 0.003916 
more emergency departments per 1000 population, which is almost 30% more of its original size. 
Table 5: Details of hypotheses regarding ACA 
 ED Density 
Uninsured2013×Post 
2.46×10-4*** 
(8.08×10-5) 
Medicaid×Post 
6.8708×10-3*** 
(1.4411×10-3) 
Uninsured2013 ×Medicaid ×Post 
-4.057×10-4*** 
(1.001×10-4) 
Profitability 
-3.49×10-10 
(2.65×10-9) 
Medical Resource 
6.8232×10-3*** 
(4.944×10-4) 
Competition 
0.346705*** 
(5.40074×10-3) 
N 714 
* indicates p-value p<0.1  ** indicates p-value p<0.05  *** indicates p-value p<0.01 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
We investigated the phenomenon about the decline in the number of emergency 
departments in the US. By using data from AHA, we found the potential reasons. We found that 
financial pressure does not affect the decision of closure of emergency department, while the 
medical resources are related to the closure decisions. Then we further investigated whether 
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competition is a reason for closure as hospitals claimed. Our results show the opposite conclusion. 
Having more competition in the same state does not lead to cannibalism, instead, it leads to more 
emergency departments in the area. The result meets our expectation of our hypothesis. We also 
found that states with a declining trend in the number of emergency departments are more sensitive 
to their profitability and medical resource. We further studied the outpatient visits and financial 
performance of hospitals. We found that medical resources and outpatient visits are negatively 
associated. We also found that hospitals cannot benefit from too many emergency department 
visits, and start to reduce profitability when emergency department visits reach a threshold level. 
Lastly, we studied the effect of ACA on emergency departments. We found that ACA does have 
positive impact on the density of emergency department of a state. The change also depends on 
the uninsured rate as well. ACA has proved to be more useful in states whose uninsured rate is 
high. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Research 
In this dissertation, we investigated three new emerging issues of the healthcare industry, 
covering new technologies, new service delivery, and new policy. The results from the three essays 
provide insights about healthcare management from many angles. 
In Chapter 2, we studied economic effects of precision medicine in healthcare. In the essay, 
we provided a theoretical framework to map a human genome into mathematical expressions. 
Based on that, we developed a novel cost-benefit dynamic model to assess learning curve effects 
in cost reduction through interaction with a centralized database repository. Then we extended our 
model to a two-step model that includes a decision between traditional medicine and precision 
medicine, and a decision between experiment treatment and database treatment. We also created 
simulation models to study the dynamics of the precision medicine approach and discussed insights 
derived from this model. Our findings include: 1) The convergence of the size of the database to a 
stable configuration is exponentially fast and the cost of precision medicine drops also very fast, 
2) Precision medicine is more effective for a society whose wealth is equally distributed, 3) 
Transparency of the database can financially support the welfare of patients.  
In Chapter 3, we studied the operations of community pharmacies incorporating MTM 
services. Based on the workflow of a traditional prescription-only pharmacy, we built both a 
queuing and a scheduling model considering MTM. We also simulated different scenarios and 
found many criteria to help pharmacy operations manager in making decisions. We discovered a 
condition when economies of scope are beneficial for a pharmacy with combined MTM and 
prescription services. We also determined  that the best resource allocation in a typical community 
pharmacy. In addition, we determined the value of a call center to a pharmacy and suggested a 
better pharmacist schedule.  
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In Chapter 4, we investigated the decline of emergency departments in the U.S.A. By using 
data we collected from AHA and the United States Census Bureau, we concluded that hospitals in 
states that reduced their emergency departments are more sensitive to the financial performance 
of hospitals and medical resources, while states that increased their emergency departments have 
less sensitivity. We also found that the launch of ACA encouraged more hospitals to have 
emergency departments as it leads to the increase in the density of emergency departments. 
In line with my research interests, I plan to pursue two research tracks. First, by extending 
the precision medicine essay, I will have a new focus on the system level analysis. To do that, I 
will use differential equations modeling to study the interactions between patient decisions, 
database, and cost. I will also continue working on my research concerning pharmacy operations. 
Although our work on pharmacy workflow design with MTM deals with a major concern in real 
practice, pharmacy competition in a local area is also a challenging problem that many pharmacies 
are facing. In my next project, we will incorporate game theory into our model and simulation. To 
enrich our understanding of pharmacy operations, I will systematically review the current practice 
in the literature and businesses, and propose methods to improve performance of pharmacies in 
terms of competition.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Appendix for Chapter 2 
Appendix A.1 Notation Table for Chapter 2 
 
Table 6: Notation Table for Chapter 2 
Notation Definition 
𝐶𝑘 Cost of the k
th method in traditional medicine 
𝑝𝑘 Probability that k
th traditional treatment is effective for the kth pathogenesis 
𝑔𝑘  Percentage of patients whose illness is caused by k
th pathogenesis 
𝑣 Health economic value of a patient 
𝑛 Number of records in the database 
𝑑𝑖 Distance between the new arrival patient and the i
th existing record in database 
𝑑 Distance between the patient and closest record in database 
𝑝𝑒 Probability of a successful experiment-based treatment 
𝑝𝑐  Probability of a curable case after gene sequencing 
𝐶𝑔 Cost of gene sequencing 
𝐶𝑒 Cost of experiments for a patient 
𝐶𝑝 Treatment cost of any precision medicine  
𝐵𝑡 Utility of using traditional treatment if applicable 
𝐵𝑝 Utility of using precision medicine if applicable 
𝐵𝑒 Utility of using experiment-based personalized treatment if applicable 
𝐵𝑑 Utility of using experience-based database treatment if applicable 
𝑁𝑡 Number of patients taking traditional treatment 
𝑁𝑔 Number of patients doing genetic mapping 
𝑁𝑒 Number of patients taking experiment-based personalized treatment 
𝑙𝑟 The r
th position of gene sequencing in a database  
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Appendix A.2 Probability Distribution of Levenshtein Distance of Best Match for 2.4.2 
Suppose we randomly place n records in a database and then the n+1th record is added to 
the database. The distance between the last record and its closest record is D. The distance 
between the last record and the ith record is Di. The value of ith record is xi and the value of the 
last record is y. We can find the probability distribution of D as follows: 
 
𝐹(𝐷𝑖|𝑦) = 𝑃(𝐷𝑖 ≤ 𝑑|𝑦) =
{
  
 
  
 
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 0 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 0.5 {
(1− 2𝑑)𝑛 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 𝑦
(1− 𝑦 − 𝑑)𝑛 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧 ≤ 𝑑 − 𝑦
0 1− 𝑦 < 𝑑 < 1
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 0.5 < 𝑦 ≤ 1{
(1− 2𝑑)𝑛 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 1− 𝑦
(𝑦 − 𝑑)𝑛 1 − 𝑦 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 𝑦
0 𝑦 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 1
 (56) 
 
 𝐹(𝐷) = 𝑃(𝐷 ≤ 𝑑) = 1 −𝑃(𝐷 ≥ 𝑑) = 1− 𝑃((𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖) ≥ 𝑑)
= 1 −𝑃(𝐷1 ≥ 𝑑 & 𝐷2 ≥ 𝑑 & 𝐷3 ≥ 𝑑 &⋯& 𝐷𝑛 ≥ 𝑑 )
= 1 −𝐸(𝐷1 ≥ 𝑑 & 𝐷2 ≥ 𝑑 & 𝐷3 ≥ 𝑑 &⋯& 𝐷𝑛 ≥ 𝑑 )
= 1 −𝐸(𝐸(𝐷1 ≥ 𝑑 & 𝐷2 ≥ 𝑑 & 𝐷3 ≥ 𝑑 &⋯& 𝐷𝑛 ≥ 𝑑 |𝑦))
= 1 −𝐸(𝑃(𝐷1 ≥ 𝑑 & 𝐷2 ≥ 𝑑 & 𝐷3 ≥ 𝑑 &⋯& 𝐷𝑛 ≥ 𝑑 |𝑦))
= 1 −𝐸(𝑃(𝐷1 ≥ 𝑑|𝑦)𝑃(𝐷2 ≥ 𝑑|𝑦)𝑃(𝐷3 ≥ 𝑑|𝑦)⋯𝑃(𝐷𝑛 ≥ 𝑑|𝑦))
= 1 −𝐸(𝑃(𝐷𝑛 ≥ 𝑑|𝑦)
𝑛) = 1 − ∫ 𝑓(𝑦)𝑃(𝐷𝑛 ≥ 𝑑|𝑦)
𝑛𝑑𝑦
1
0
= 1 −
{
 
 
 
 ∫ (1− 2𝑑)𝑛𝑑𝑦
1−𝑑
𝑑
+ ∫ (1− 𝑦 − 𝑑)𝑛𝑑𝑦
𝑑
0
+∫ (𝑦− 𝑑)𝑛𝑑𝑦
1
1−𝑑
0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 0.5
∫ (1 − 𝑦 − 𝑑)𝑛𝑑𝑦
1−𝑑
𝑑
+∫ (𝑦− 𝑑)𝑛𝑑𝑦
1
𝑑
0.5 < 𝑑 ≤ 1
=
{
 
 1− (1 − 2𝑑)𝑛+1 −
2(1 − 𝑑)𝑛+1
𝑛 + 1
+
2(1 − 2𝑑)𝑛+1
𝑛 + 1
0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 0.5
1 −
2(1 − 𝑑)𝑛+1
𝑛 + 1
0.5 < 𝑑 ≤ 1
 
(57) 
 
 
𝑓(𝐷) =
𝜕𝐹(𝐷)
𝜕𝑑
= {
2(𝑛− 1)(1− 2𝑑)𝑛 +2(1 − 𝑑)𝑛 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 0.5
2(1 − 𝑑)𝑛 0.5 < 𝑑 ≤ 1
 
 
(58) 
    
 
𝐸(𝐷) =
𝑛 + 3
2(𝑛+ 1)(𝑛+ 2)
 
 
(59) 
 
Yucheng Chen - University of Connecticut, 2019 
91 
 
𝐸
(𝐵
𝑝 )
=
 𝑝
𝑐
(
∫
𝑓
(𝑑
)𝐸
(𝐵
𝑑 ) 𝑑
(𝑑
)
𝑑
′
0
+
𝐵
𝑒
∫
𝑓
(𝑑
) 𝑑
(𝑑
)
1
𝑑
′
)
−
(1
−
𝑝
𝑐 )𝐶
𝑔
=
{             
𝑝
𝑐
(   
∫
(2 (𝑛
−
1 )(1
−
2𝑑
)
𝑛
+
2 (1
−
𝑑
)
𝑛)[𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
(1
−
𝑑
)
2𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝐶
𝑝 ] 𝑑
(𝑑
)
𝑑
′
0
+
(𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑒
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝐶
𝑝 )
(
(1
−
2𝑑
)
𝑛
+
1
+
2 (1
−
𝑑
)
𝑛
+
1
𝑛
+
1
−
2 (1
−
2𝑑
)
𝑛
+
1
𝑛
+
1
)
)   
−
(1
−
𝑝
𝑐 )𝐶
𝑔
0
≤
𝑑
′
≤
0
.5
𝑝
𝑐
(     
∫
(2 (𝑛
−
1 )(1
−
2𝑑
)
𝑛
+
2 (1
−
𝑑
)
𝑛)[𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
(1
−
𝑑
)
2𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝐶
𝑝 ] 𝑑
(𝑑
)
0
.5
0
+
∫
2 (1
−
𝑑
)
𝑛[𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
(1
−
𝑑
)
2𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝐶
𝑝 ] 𝑑
(𝑑
)
𝑑
′
0
.5
+
(𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑒
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝐶
𝑝 )
2 (1
−
𝑑
)
𝑛
+
1
𝑛
+
1
)     
−
(1
−
𝑝
𝑐 )𝐶
𝑔
 
0
.5
<
𝑑
′
≤
1
=
{             
𝑝
𝑐 𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
(
(1
−
2𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
1
−
2
(1
−
2
𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
1
𝑛
+
1
+
2 (1
−
𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
1
𝑛
+
1
)
+
2 (1
−
(1
−
𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
3)
𝑛
+
3
𝛼
𝑝
𝑐 𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
+
(𝑛
−
1 )(7
+
8𝑛
+
2
𝑛
2)(1
−
(1
−
2𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
1)
2
(𝑛
+
1 )(𝑛
+
2 )(𝑛
+
3 )
𝛼
𝑝
𝑐 𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
−
(𝑛
−
1 )(1
−
2
𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
1(
2𝑑
′ 2(𝑛
+
1 )(𝑛
+
2 )
−
2𝑑
′(𝑛
+
1 )(5
+
2
𝑛
))
2 (𝑛
+
1 )(𝑛
+
2 )(𝑛
+
3 )
𝛼
𝑝
𝑐 𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
−
𝑝
𝑐 𝐶
𝑒
(
(1
−
2𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
1
+
2 (1
−
𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
1
𝑛
+
1
−
2 (1
−
2𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
1
𝑛
+
1
)
−
𝑝
𝑐 𝐶
𝑝
−
𝐶
𝑔
0
≤
𝑑
′
≤
0
.5
𝑝
𝑐 𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
(
2 (1
−
𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
1
𝑛
+
1
−
2 (1
−
𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
3
(𝑛
+
3 )
𝛼
+
1
+
1
1
𝑛
+
1
0
𝑛
2
+
2
𝑛
3
2 (𝑛
+
1 )(𝑛
+
2 )(𝑛
+
3 )
𝛼
)
−
𝑝
𝑐 𝐶
𝑒
2
(1
−
𝑑
′)
𝑛
+
1
𝑛
+
1
−
𝑝
𝑐 𝐶
𝑝
−
𝐶
𝑔
0
.5
<
𝑑
′
≤
1
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 A
.3
 E
x
p
ected
 U
tility
 o
f P
recisio
n
 M
ed
icin
e fo
r 2
.4
.2
 
 
(6
0
) 
 
 
Yucheng Chen - University of Connecticut, 2019 
92 
 
𝐸
(𝐵
𝑝 )
=
𝑝
𝑐
(
∫
2
𝑛
𝐸
(𝐵
𝑑 )
𝑆
1
0
 𝑑
(𝑑
)
+
∫
(2
𝑛
−
1
)𝐸
(𝐵
𝑑 )
𝑆
2
𝑆
1
 𝑑
(𝑑
)
+
⋯
+
∫
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
+
1
)𝐸
(𝐵
𝑑 )
𝑆
𝑢
𝑆
(𝑢
−
1
)
 𝑑
(𝑑
)
+
∫
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
)𝐸
(𝐵
𝑑 ) 𝑑
(𝑑
)
𝑑
′
𝑆
𝑢
+
𝐵
𝑒 (
1
−
∫
2
𝑛
𝑆
1
0
 𝑑
(𝑑
)
−
∫
(2
𝑛
−
1
)
𝑆
2
𝑆
1
 𝑑
(𝑑
)
−
⋯
−
∫
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
+
1
)
𝑆
𝑢
𝑆
(𝑢
−
1
)
 𝑑
(𝑑
)
−
∫
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
) 𝑑
(𝑑
)
𝑑
′
𝑆
𝑢
)
)
−
(1
−
𝑝
𝑐 )𝐶
𝑔
=
𝑝
𝑐
(
∫
2
𝑛
[𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
(1
−
𝑑
)
2𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝐶
𝑝 ]
𝑆
1
0
𝑑
(𝑑
)
+
∫
(2
𝑛
−
1
)[𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
(1
−
𝑑
)
2𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝑝
𝑐 ]
𝑆
2
𝑆
1
 𝑑
(𝑑
)
+
⋯
+
∫
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
+
1
)[𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
(1
−
𝑑
)
2𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝐶
𝑝 ]
𝑆
𝑢
𝑆
(𝑢
−
1
)
𝑑
(𝑑
)
+
∫
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
)[𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
(1
−
𝑑
)
2𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝐶
𝑝 ]
𝑑
′
𝑆
𝑢
𝑑
(𝑑
)
+
(𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑒
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝐶
𝑝 )
(
1
−
∫
2
𝑛
𝑆
1
0
 𝑑
(𝑑
)
−
∫
(2
𝑛
−
1
)
𝑆
2
𝑆
1
 𝑑
(𝑑
)
−
⋯
−
∫
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
+
1
)
𝑆
𝑢
𝑆
(𝑢
−
1
)
 𝑑
(𝑑
)
−
∫
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
) 𝑑
(𝑑
)
𝑑
′
𝑆
𝑢
)
)
−
(1
−
𝑝
𝑐 )𝐶
𝑔
=
𝑝
𝑐
(
2
𝑛
𝑣
𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
3
−
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
)
𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
𝑣
(1
−
𝑑
′)
3
3
−
∑
𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
𝑣
(1
−
𝑆
𝑗 )
3
3
𝑢
𝑗
=
1
+
(𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑒 )
(
1
−
∑
𝑆
𝑗
𝑢
𝑗
=
1
−
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
)𝑑
′)
)
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝑝
𝑐 𝐶
𝑝
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 A
.4
 E
x
p
ected
 U
tility
 o
f P
recisio
n
 M
ed
icin
e fo
r 2
.4
.3
 
 
(6
1
)  
Yucheng Chen - University of Connecticut, 2019 
93 
 
𝐸
(𝐵
𝑝 )
=
{             
𝑝
𝑐
(        
2
𝑛
𝑣
𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
−
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
)𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
𝑣
(
√
1
−
𝐶
𝑒
𝑝
𝑒
𝑣
√
𝛼
)
3
+
∑
𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
𝑣
(1
−
𝑆
𝑗 )
3
𝑢𝑗
=
1
3
+
(𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
−
𝐶
𝑒 )
(   
1
−
∑
𝑆
𝑗
𝑢
𝑗
=
1
−
(2
𝑛
−
𝑢
)
(  
1
−
√
1
−
𝐶
𝑒
𝑝
𝑒
𝑣
√
𝛼
)  
)   
)        
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝑝
𝑐 𝐶
𝑝
𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
(1
−
𝛼
(1
−
𝑆
2
𝑛
)
2)
>
𝐶
𝑒
𝑝
𝑐
(
2
𝑛
𝑝
𝑒 𝛼
𝑣
3
−
∑
𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
(1
−
𝑆
𝑗 )
3
3
2
𝑛
𝑗
=
1
)
−
𝐶
𝑔
−
𝑝
𝑐 𝐶
𝑝
𝑝
𝑒 𝑣
(1
−
𝛼
(1
−
𝑆
2
𝑛
)
2)
<
𝐶
𝑒  
(6
2
) 
Yucheng Chen - University of Connecticut, 2019 
94 
 
Appendix A.5 Probability Distribution of Levenshtein Distance of Best Match for 2.4.4 
Suppose a patient does not know the structure of the database and only knows about the n 
records are in the database. Suppose x is the location of the patient’s genetic position. He would 
expect records are uniformly distributed in the database. We assume the distance between the 
new patient point and the ith patient is Di 
 
𝑓(𝐷𝑖) = {
2 0 < 𝑑 < 𝑥
1  𝑥 < 𝑑 < 1 − 𝑥
𝑥 ≤ 0.5
2 0 < 𝑑 < 1 − 𝑥
1 1 − 𝑥 < 𝑑 < 𝑥
𝑥 > 0.5
 (63) 
 
𝐹(𝐷𝑖) = {
2𝑑 0 < 𝑑 < 𝑥
𝑥 + 𝑑 𝑥 < 𝑑 < 1− 𝑥
𝑥 ≤ 0.5
2𝑑 0 < 𝑑 < 1− 𝑥
1− 𝑥 + 𝑑 1 − 𝑥 < 𝑑 < 𝑥
𝑥 > 0.5
 (64) 
 
 𝐹(𝐷) = 𝑃(𝐷 ≤ 𝑑) = 1 −𝑃(𝐷 ≥ 𝑑) = 1− 𝑃((𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖) ≥ 𝑑)
= 1− 𝑃(𝐷1 ≥ 𝑑 & 𝐷2 ≥ 𝑑 & 𝐷3 ≥ 𝑑 &⋯& 𝐷𝑛 ≥ 𝑑 )
= 1− 𝑃(𝐷1 ≥ 𝑑 )𝑃(𝐷2 ≥ 𝑑 )𝑃(𝐷3 ≥ 𝑑 )⋯ 𝑃(𝐷𝑛 ≥ 𝑑 )
= 1
− (1 − 𝑃(𝐷1 ≤ 𝑑 ))(1 − 𝑃(𝐷2 ≤ 𝑑 ))(1 − 𝑃(𝐷3 ≤ 𝑑 ))⋯(1
− 𝑃(𝐷𝑛 ≤ 𝑑 )) = 1 − (1 −𝑃(𝐷𝑖 ≤ 𝑑 ))
𝑛
 
(65) 
 
𝐹(𝐷) = {
1− (1 − 2𝑑)𝑛 0 < 𝑑 < 𝑥
1 − (1 − 𝑥 − 𝑑)𝑛 𝑥 < 𝑑 < 1− 𝑥
𝑥 ≤ 0.5
1 − (1 − 2𝑑)𝑛 0 < 𝑑 < 1 − 𝑥
1 − (𝑥 − 𝑑)𝑛 1 − 𝑥 < 𝑑 < 𝑥
𝑥 > 0.5
 (66) 
 
 
𝑓(𝐷) =
{
 
 
2𝑛(1 − 2𝑑)𝑛−1 0 < 𝑑 < 𝑥
𝑛(1 − 𝑥 − 𝑑)𝑛−1 𝑥 < 𝑑 < 1− 𝑥
𝑥 ≤ 0.5
2𝑛(1 − 2𝑑)𝑛−1 0 < 𝑑 < 1− 𝑥
𝑛(𝑥 − 𝑑)𝑛−1 1 − 𝑥 < 𝑑 < 𝑥
𝑥 > 0.5
 (67) 
 
 𝐸(𝑝) = 𝐸(1 − 𝑑)
=
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∫ 2𝑛(1 − 2𝑑)𝑛−1(1 − 𝑑)𝑑(𝑑)
𝑥
0
+∫ 𝑛(1 − 𝑥 − 𝑑)𝑛−1(1 − 𝑑)𝑑(𝑑)
1−𝑥
𝑥
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1 + 2𝑛 − (1 − 2𝑥)1+𝑛
2(𝑛+ 1)
𝑥 ≤ 0.5
∫ 2𝑛(1 − 2𝑑)𝑛−1(1 − 𝑑)𝑑(𝑑)
1−𝑥
0
+∫ 𝑛(𝑥 − 𝑑)𝑛−1(1 − 𝑑)𝑑(𝑑)
𝑥
1−𝑥
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1+ 2𝑛 − (−1+ 2𝑥)1+𝑛
2(𝑛 + 1)
𝑥 > 0.5
 
 
(68) 
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𝐸(𝑑) =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∫ 2𝑛(1 − 2𝑑)𝑛−1𝑑(𝑑)
𝑥
0
+∫ 𝑛(1 − 𝑥 − 𝑑)𝑛−1𝑑(𝑑)
1−𝑥
𝑥
=
1 + (1 − 2𝑥)1+𝑛
2(𝑛 + 1)
𝑥 ≤ 0.5
∫ 2𝑛(1 − 2𝑑)𝑛−1𝑑(𝑑)
1−𝑥
0
+∫ 𝑛(𝑥 − 𝑑)𝑛−1𝑑(𝑑)
𝑥
1−𝑥
=
1+ (−1+ 2𝑥)1+𝑛
2(𝑛 + 1)
𝑥 > 0.5
 
 
(69) 
Appendix B. Appendix for Chapter 3 
Appendix B.1 Notation Table for Chapter 3 
Table 7: Notation Table for Chapter 3 
Parameters 
λt Patient external arrival rate during time slot t; 
µpk Service rate of a pharmacist while performing task k; 
µhk Service rate of a technician while performing task k; 
T Number of time slots. 
Decision Variables 
xt Whether prescription services are provided during time slot t; 
yt Whether CMR services are provided during time slot t; 
zt Whether TMR services are provided during time slot t. 
Objective Functions 
R Expected revenue from prescriptions for the full period; 
G Expected revenue from CMR services for the full period; 
H Expected revenue from TMR services for the full period; 
W Expected opportunity cost from customers waiting for the full period. 
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Appendix B.2 Simulation Attributes and assumptions 
Attributes and assumptions for patients: 
Patients are classified into two groups: prescription patients and counseling only patients. 
Prescription patients go through the entire prescription process, while counseling-only patients 
only seek counsel from pharmacists.  
Prescription patients are classified into two groups: waiters and non-waiters. Waiters are patients 
who wait in the pharmacy until their prescription package is ready, while non-waiters are 
patients who come back later to pick up their package. Waiters are always given more priority 
than non-waiters to be served.  
There is a 100% pick up rate for a waiter, while 20% of non-waiters do not pick up their 
packages. 
Attributes and assumptions for Rx: 
Rxs are classified into two groups : non-eRx, and eRx.  
By refill state, Rxs are also classified into two groups: refill, and non-refill (50% refill, 50% non-
refill). 
The two classifications of transferring methods are independent and random. 
RTS can happen with a certain probability only when the Rx is non-eRx and Refill . 
If an Rx is eRx, the patient is reassigned as a non-waiter.  
If an Rx is a RTS, the patient is reassigned as a non-waiter. 
The number of prescriptions in an Rx follows a triangle distribution (min 1, max 5, most likely 
2). 
Attributes and assumptions for Prescriptions: 
Prescriptions are classified into two groups: Controlled Substance and Non-Controlled 
Substance.  
A controlled substance needs more time to be processed than a non-controlled substance in most 
of the steps. 
Controlled substances are more likely to have insurance problems and DUR problems than non-
controlled substances.  
Insurance problems and DUR problems of controlled substances are less likely to be resolved, 
(leading a denial of the prescription) than non-controlled substances. 
Prescriptions have a certain probability to be out of stock. 
If controlled substances has are of stock, they will be denied and moved out of the system. If 
Non-Controlled Substances are out of stock, they will wait for the inventory to be replenished. 
If a prescription is from a refill Rx, it will not have an insurance problem. 
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Assumptions for Packages: 
Prescriptions of an Rx are grouped into a package when all the prescriptions are processed. 
When a prescription is denied, or is out of stock, the rest of the prescriptions will be packed 
without this prescription. 
When an out of stock prescription is replenished, this prescription is packed into a separate 
package, and the pharmacy notifies the patient that the prescription is ready for pickup. 
Attributes and assumptions for phone calls: 
Phone calls are first answered by a technician, and have certain probability to be transferred to a 
pharmacist for further assistance. 
When answering a phone call, by either a pharmacist or a technician, the resource reduces his 
working efficiency to ¼. 
A pharmacist can only answer a phone call, when he is not doing jobs that require talking with 
people (e.g., insurance checks, solve a DUR problem, counseling a patient, MTM service). 
A technician can only answer a phone call, when he is not doing jobs that require talking with 
people (e.g., data entry for waiters, call insurance company, pick up package for a patient, check 
out). 
Other assumptions: 
A pharmacist does MTM when and only when he has no prescription jobs to do. 
There are sufficient TMRs and CMRs jobs for a pharmacist to do. A pharmacist will do a TMR 
or a CMR whenever he is free. 
A successful CMR or TMR yields more revenue than an unsuccessful one. However, an 
unsuccessful one takes less time. 
Technicians recycle packages that are not picked up, by putting them back to shelf after certain 
amount of time (12 days after they are packed). 
The pharmacy operates 14 hours 7 days a week from 8 am to 10 pm. 
Mondays, Tuesdays, and Fridays are peak days, where average number of arriving-prescription 
patients is 1.5 times of that of a regular day. 
The peak hours of the pharmacy are 11 am to 1 pm, and 5 pm to 8 pm of a day, where average 
number of arriving-prescription patients is 1.5 times of that of a regular hour.  
The number of arriving-prescription patients to the pharmacy follows a Poisson distribution with 
an average 20 persons per hour on regular hours. 
The number of arriving counseling-only patients to the pharmacy follows a Poisson distribution 
with an average 5 persons per hour for all the time. 
The number of arriving phone calls to the pharmacy follows a Poisson distribution with an 
average 15 persons per hour for all the time. 
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The pharmacy replenishes its inventory every weekday. 
In the baseline model, there are 2 full time pharmacists and 3 full time technicians 
Appendix B.3 Service Priority Rule 
Pharmacists and technicians work for different requests following a priority rule. 
Requests of higher priority are always served first. When two jobs are of the same priority, we 
apply first-come-first-serve rule. The priority orders are shown in Table 8. Priority is listed 1-3, 
where 1 is the highest priority and 3 is the lowest priority.  
Table 8: Processing priority 
 Pharmacist Technician 
 Waiter Non-Waiter Waiter Non-Waiter 
Data Entry   1 3 
Insurance Problem Solving 2 3 2 3 
Data Review 2 3   
DUR Problem Solving 2 3   
Filling and Labeling   2 3 
Product Check 2 3   
Bagging 2 3   
Counselling 1 1   
Checkout   1 1 
Recycling medication    3 
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Appendix B.4 Parameters and Values 
We obtained the values of the parameters from a panel of pharmacists. The parameters 
and values are as follows in Table 9. 
Table 9: Parameters and values for simulation 
Parameters Value Unit 
Average time for recycling a medication 15 Seconds/Prescription 
Average time for Bagging a package and a Rx Storage 4 Seconds/Prescription 
Average time for Checking a Product 8 Seconds/Prescription 
Average time for a Checkout 60 Seconds/Patient 
Average time for a Counseling 45 Seconds/Patient 
Average time for a Data Review of a controlled substance 60 Seconds/Prescription 
Average time for Data Review for a NCM 30 Seconds/Prescription 
Average time for Drop off and Data Entry of a prescription 20 Seconds/Prescription 
Average time for Solving a DUR Problem for a CM 180 Seconds/Prescription 
Average time for Solving a DUR Problem for a NCM 90 Seconds/Prescription 
Average time for Filling and Labeling a medication 20 Seconds/Prescription 
Average time for Solving an Insurance Problem 2 Seconds/Prescription 
Average time for answering Phone call by a Pharmacist 90 Seconds/Call 
Average time for answering Phone call by a Technician 90 Seconds/Call 
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Average time for a technician to find and to take the Package of 
a patient 
10 Seconds/Patient 
Average time for processing a Successful CMR 30 Minutes/Case 
Average time for processing a Successful TMR 10 Minutes/Case 
Average time for processing an Unsuccessful CMR 2 Minutes/Case 
Average time for processing an Unsuccessful TMR 2 Minutes/Case 
Controlled Medication rate of total 0.2 Probability 
Hours Per Day 14 Hours 
Max Days Pharmacy Await for s non waiter 12 Days 
Prescription Patient Arrival rate Hourly Baseline 10 Person/Hour 
Pharmacist Working Efficiency Reduction when is 
multitasking 
0.75 Rate 
Profit of a Successful CMR 65 Dollars/Case 
Profit of an Unsuccessful CMR 2 Dollars/Case 
Profit of a Successful TMR 12 Dollars/Case 
Profit of an Unsuccessful TMR 2 Dollars/Case 
Rate of a Product, which does not have a mistake 0.95 Probability 
Rate of a DUR Problem which can be Solved for a CM 0.75 Probability 
Rate of a DUR Problem which can be Solved for a NCM 0.9 Probability 
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Rate for an Insurance Pass of a CM 0.9 Probability 
Rate for an Insurance Pass for a NCM 0.95 Probability 
Rate of a CM Insurance Problem that cannot be Solved 0.8 Probability 
Rate of an NCM Insurance Problem that cannot be Solved 0.2 Probability 
Rate of passing the Inventory check 0.95 Probability 
Rate of Medication Data Correct for eRx 0.9 Probability 
Rate Medication Data Correct for Non-eRx 0.8 Probability 
Rate No DUR Problem for CM 0.75 Probability 
Rate No DUR Problem for NCM 0.80 Probability 
Rate of Counselling Patients 0.1 Probability 
Refill Rate 0.5 Probability 
RTS Rate of Refill 0.25 Probability 
Successful CMR Rate 0.75 Probability 
Successful TMR Rate 0.75 Probability 
Technician Working Efficiency Reduction 0.75 Rate 
Phone Call Transfer Rate 0.35 Probability 
Waiter Rate of Walk in Patient 0.75 Probability 
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Appendix C. Appendix for Chapter 3 
Appendix C.1Variable Definition 
Table 10. Variable definition 
Key Variables 
Density of ED 
The number of emergency departments divided by state population 
(per 1000 population) 
Percentage of ED 
The number of emergency departments divided by the number of 
total community hospitals 
Frequency of ED Visits 
The number of emergency departments visits divided by state 
population (per 1000 population) 
Frequency of Other 
Visits 
The number of other outpatient visits divided by state population 
(per 1000 population) 
Ratio of Other Visits & 
ED Visits 
The number of other outpatient visits divided by the number of 
emergency departments visits 
Profitability The total profit divided by the total hospital inpatient beds 
Medical Resource 
The number of total hospital inpatient beds divided by state 
population (per 1000 population) 
Competition 
The number of urgent care centers divided by state population (per 
1000 population) 
ACA 
Equal to 1 since the second year of the approval of ACA, while 
equal to 0 before ACA is approved 
Medicaid Expansion 
Binary viable, where 1 represents Medicaid Expansion is effective, 
and 0 represents Medicaid Expansion is not effective 
Uninsured Percentage of population who do not have health insurance 
Controlled Variable 
Unemployed Rate Percentage of population who are not employed 
Median household 
Income 
Median household income in dollars 
Density of Community 
Hospitals 
The number of total community hospitals divided by state 
population (per 1000 population) 
Percentage of Public 
Hospitals 
The number of public hospitals divided by the number of total 
community hospitals 
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Appendix C.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Density of EDs 714 0.019 0.0145 0.0131 0.0043 0.073 
Percentage of EDs 714 0.844 0.849 0.084 0.533 1 
Frequency of ED Visits 714 421.63 409.39 93.79 234.87 608.41 
Frequency of Other Visits 714 1858.1 1745.17 760.32 901.51 5310.83 
Medical Resources 714 2.913  2.683 0.946 1.66 6.233 
Profitability 714 51307 42892  42526 -57602.93 289597 
Competition 714 0.00467 0.0037 0.0031 0 0.018 
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